
Contents
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7.1 A Caveat and a Reminder 7.1 A Caveat and a Reminder
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7.1.1 Dogmatic Forgetfulness and Sceptical Hope 7.1.1 Dogmatic Forgetfulness and Sceptical Hope
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7.1.2 True Philosophy’s Three-Step Dialectic 7.1.2 True Philosophy’s Three-Step Dialectic
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7.2 Epistemological Dogmatism 7.2 Epistemological Dogmatism
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7.2.1 The Criterion: Evidence, Certainty and Undeniability 7.2.1 The Criterion: Evidence, Certainty and Undeniability
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7.2.2 Above the Winds and Clouds: The Abstruse, Difficult and Ephemeral 7.2.2 Above the Winds and Clouds: The Abstruse, Difficult and Ephemeral
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7.2.3 The Technai of Doubt 7.2.3 The Technai of Doubt
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7.2.3.1 Reason: regresses, contradictions, self-cancellations. 7.2.3.1 Reason: regresses, contradictions, self-cancellations.
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7.2.3.1.2 Reason in the first Enquiry: Hume’s ‘chief objection’. 7.2.3.1.2 Reason in the first Enquiry: Hume’s ‘chief objection’.
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7.2.3.1.3 Inductive reason: begging the question of nature. 7.2.3.1.3 Inductive reason: begging the question of nature.
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7.2.3.1.4 Self-reflexive purgatives: sheltering ‘Samson’ under the ‘throne’. 7.2.3.1.4 Self-reflexive purgatives: sheltering ‘Samson’ under the ‘throne’.
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7.2.3.2 The senses: perceptions as appearances. 7.2.3.2 The senses: perceptions as appearances.
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7.2.3.2.1 The awful gap and the limits of representation. 7.2.3.2.1 The awful gap and the limits of representation.
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7.2.3.2.2 Relative ideas of the ‘specifically different’ 7.2.3.2.2 Relative ideas of the ‘specifically different’
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7.2.3.2.3 Radicalising the way of ideas. 7.2.3.2.3 Radicalising the way of ideas.
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7.3 Metaphysical Dogmatism 7.3 Metaphysical Dogmatism
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7.3.1 External Metaphysics 7.3.1 External Metaphysics
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7.3.1.1 Ancient dogmatic philosophy. 7.3.1.1 Ancient dogmatic philosophy.
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7.3.1.2 Modern dogmatic philosophy. 7.3.1.2 Modern dogmatic philosophy.
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7.3.1.2.1 False philosophies of primary qualities. 7.3.1.2.1 False philosophies of primary qualities.
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7.3.1.2.2 False philosophies of causal power. 7.3.1.2.2 False philosophies of causal power.
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7.3.2 Internal Metaphysics 7.3.2 Internal Metaphysics
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7.3.2.1 The immateriality of the soul. 7.3.2.1 The immateriality of the soul.
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7.3.2.2 Personal identity. 7.3.2.2 Personal identity.
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7.4 Conclusion 7.4 Conclusion
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Notes Notes
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7 Technai: Dogmatism and the Technologies of Doubt
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Published:December 2019
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Abstract
Chapter Seven undertakes to articulate Hume’s scepticism with regard to the third dimension of the Pyrrhonian Fourfold—technê. More particularly, the chapter examines the instruments he deploys against dogmatism, that is his technologies of doubt. The chapter devotes special attention to Hume’s sceptical arguments regarding the epistemic capacities of reason and the senses, especially in regard to the primary/secondary quality distinction and what Hume calls ‘false philosophy.’ The text argues that Hume is an entirely radical sceptic who refuses all epistemic and metaphysical claims, including those related to personal identity, the immateriality of the soul, hidden substances, energies, and powers, including the causal power. The chapter explains what exactly counts for Hume as dogmatism and what is not consistent with scepticism. The chapter explores the import to empiricism of Hume’s Copy Principle.
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