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Melvyn P. Leffler, Commentary, Diplomatic History, Volume 15, Issue 4, October 1991, Pages 548–553, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1991.tb00149.x
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The document is a tease. Clearly, it was part of an internal policy debate. From Novikov's memoir we know that Molotov encouraged the Washington embassy to send this analysis to Moscow.1 But no other documents have been made available to illuminate the identities and positions of Molotov's adversaries. To grasp the context of decision making we still need to rely on books by Werner Hahn, William McCagg, Gavriel Ra'anan, Albert Resis, Timothy Dunmore, and other scholars who base their stimulating accounts of infighting in the Kremlin on inadequate source materials.2 What we do know is that Stalin remained the final arbiter of these debates. And it is interesting and important to note that at the time this telegram arrived in Moscow, and for many months thereafter, Stalin was not yet prepared to accept Novikov's and Molotov's advice and interpretation.3
Viewed as part of an internal debate, we should take this telegram seriously. What is most conspicuous, and perhaps least important, is how little it reveals about Soviet foreign policy objectives. Of course, we would not ordinarily expect an embassy analyzing the foreign policy of a host nation to provide extensive policy prescriptions. But Kennan's "long telegram," to which Novikov's dispatch is now being compared, provided the basic contours of the containment policy.4 In contrast, Novikov and his aides say almost nothing about Soviet goals. Should Soviet diplomacy be defensive or offensive? Should it pursue revolutionary objectives or nationalistic ones? Should it support a spheres-of-influence approach or should it be more ambitious and risk taking? Novikov alludes to the postwar disequilibrium in the international system, but says little about the potential for revolutionary successes, Communist party victories, decolonization, and other matters that would be of critical importance to officials in the Kremlin who were making key decisions about Soviet-American relations in the postwar period.
