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Jack Wass, Jurisdiction by Estoppel and Acquiescence in International Courts and Tribunals, British Yearbook of International Law, Volume 86, Issue 1, 2016, Pages 155–195, https://doi.org/10.1093/bybil/brx005
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Abstract
The doctrines of estoppel and acquiescence, which derive from the general principle of good faith, are well established in certain spheres of public international law, such as disputes over territory. This article examines whether they have a role to play in disputes over the jurisdiction of an international court or tribunal. Can it be said that a respondent has acquiesced in the jurisdiction of a tribunal, or is estopped from denying its jurisdiction? That question is contentious because it is sometimes said that the consensual nature of international jurisdiction excludes the operation of those doctrines. This article submits that the doctrines may be invoked in the establishment of a tribunal’s jurisdiction. While acquiescence is an expression of consent (through silence or conduct), estoppel precludes a respondent from denying that it has consented to the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Both doctrines have a legitimate role to play, and reinforce, rather than undermine, the consensual nature of international jurisdiction.
