4 An Adaptive Conception of Childhood

‘We promise to treat each other with dignity and respect. We promise to be open and sensitive to our differences.’

Children’s Statement from the UN Special Session on Children 2002

The previous chapters have explored the limitations of both Life-Stage and Liberationist conceptions of ‘childhood’ in justifying their categorisation of children. Life-Stage approaches fail to adequately justify the strict differentiation of children from adults, while Liberationists struggle to justify the strict equality between them. Building upon insights from both perspectives, this chapter introduces an alternative and more nuanced conception of ‘childhood’ (an adaptive model) that embraces diversity while upholding the principle of basic liberal equality.

The proposed conception of ‘childhood’ considers three fundamental frameworks that shape an individual’s existence: embodiment, temporality, and space. The acute impact of these frameworks on an individual is determined by their vulnerability, developmental processes, and embeddedness respectively. Vulnerability has already been established as a justifying feature for differential categorisation (see the section ‘Equal Treatment and Vulnerability’ in Chapter 3). In this chapter, I explore how an individual’s developmental processes (temporality) and their embedded relationship to their environment (space) may also warrant differential categorisation and treatment in accordance with basic liberal principles.

Learning from the limitations that affect Life-Stage and Liberationist conceptions, I introduce a more nuanced conception of ‘childhood’, one that is more sensitive to the diversity of the human condition. It accounts for the role that social constructions play in framing a human life and the capacity of individuals as agents who mould their own condition. In line with sociological research on childhood, it aims to encourage understanding ‘childhood’ as a radically plural phenomenon (James et al. 1998, 27). It is an account that, while grounded on universal frameworks that constitute the human condition (embodiment, temporality, space, and agency), is sensitive to the diverse ways in which these frameworks affect the individual, and to the plural paths through which the individual relates to them. Following recent work on social biology, sociology, and psychology, the chapter claims that, even if the three frameworks structure and delimit a human life, individuals themselves, through their ability to adapt to their environment and condition, transform our preconceptions about the role that the individual plays in determining how these constitutive frameworks may impact who they are. The adaptive model of ‘childhood’ that is presented in this chapter appeals to the variable relationship each individual has with their own embodiment, their temporal condition, and their environment. It argues that a liberal political project must acknowledge this variability to justify differential treatment while maintaining equal respect for all individuals.

The underlying idea is that understanding ‘childhood’ need not involve an all-or-nothing approach to defining its specific characteristics and boundaries. By recognising certain constitutive frameworks as universal characteristics applicable to all humans, we pave the way for a moral and political account of children’s status that treats them as equals while accounting for the particular circumstances that warrant differential treatment. This chapter sets the stage for a more inclusive and responsive understanding of ‘childhood’, moving away from rigid categorisations and embracing the dynamic and diverse nature of the human condition. It invites a reconsideration of the relationship between individuals and the frameworks that shape their lives, ultimately seeking an approach that better ensures basic freedom and equality.

The human condition exists within various ‘inescapable frameworks’ (Taylor 1989, chapter 1). These are the physical, social, and conceptual boundaries that delimit and constitute who humans are, who they can be, and what gives value to their life. We all have bodies (embodied framework), we all exist in time (temporal framework), and we all occupy a space in the physical and social world (spatial framework). We cannot understand who humans are, or who a particular individual is, without locating them within these frameworks. However, as seen in previous chapters (Chapters 2 and 3), dominant approaches fail to fully account for the plural ways in which individuals can be located within these frameworks, despite that they should be seen as the ‘inescapable contexts’ from which any study of the human condition should be built upon (James et al. 1998, 34).

Building on the indisputable fact that humans have bodies, exist in time, and occupy space, I aim to explore how analysing the human condition through these frameworks can lead to a more robust understanding of ‘childhood’. In Chapter 3, vulnerability, a characteristic of the embodied framework, was introduced as a legitimate basis for differential categorisation. By examining the vulnerability of certain individuals and their relationships to the social world, I identified how it can justify differential categorisation. This chapter delves into the other two frameworks that contextualise human life: temporality and spatiality. It investigates the concepts of development within the temporal framework, and embeddedness within the spatial framework to further elucidate the necessity for differential categorisation.

The human life is inevitably determined and framed by its embodiment. Humans are conditioned by their corporeality, and its plural manifestations lead to varied influence of this framework on particular individuals. Children are usually defined as beings with particularly vulnerable embodiments.¹ This is the fundamental reason why it is considered that they are owed an especially protective and restrictive treatment: their vulnerable condition can have substantively corrosive effects on their life. Failing to consider how embodiment affects human ontology, as some Liberationist perspectives do (see the section ‘Not Entirely Different but not Equal’ in Chapter 3), can have serious consequences for those who are particularly susceptible to harm based on their embodied condition.

Moreover, vulnerability must be understood within the context of socio-legal structures (Mackenzie et al. 2014). While our embodiment can make us inherently vulnerable to certain forms of harm, vulnerability can stem from oppressive external sources: we are not always naturally vulnerable to social practices or environments; the particular ways in which practices and environments are constructed can make certain embodiments vulnerable to them. Intersections of gender, ethnicity, or disability can have a great influence on an individual’s embodied experience, not always because of inherent vulnerabilities tied to certain human characteristics, but instead because of the problematic ways in which society and law respond to certain embodiments (Fineman 2008). Blind individuals are not inherently vulnerable to walking in urban environments; it is the lack of accommodation in urban settings for individuals without sight that creates vulnerabilities for them. For example, a blind person might be perfectly capable of navigating a city if there were tactile maps and Braille signs everywhere. But if the city does not see eye to eye with the needs of the blind, they are at a much greater risk of harm.

Accounting for the plural sources of vulnerability that affect an individual is necessary for ensuring that their embodiment does not impose unjust burdens on their lives. Although vulnerability is a characteristic especially prominent during childhood, it is a condition that exists to varied degrees throughout the whole human life-course, and, if it is used as a justificatory mechanism for differential categorisation, it must be tracked throughout it, in order to do justice to the particular claims that all individuals may have based on their embodied condition.

The temporal framework pertains to the condition of humans as existing in time. From birth, we experience a constant state of flux. Our needs, capacities, and weaknesses undergo rapid changes, growth, and decline at different stages of our lives. Humans cannot be studied as static entities; instead, we must assess them within the evolving and dynamic context of their temporality. Similar to vulnerability being the defining characteristic of an individual’s embodied framework, development plays a crucial role in shaping ‘childhood’ as a temporal condition. To comprehend children within the dimension of time, it is essential to understand how ‘development’ can be conceptualised and the role it plays in framing ‘childhood’ as a relevant social category.

The notion of ‘development’ as a central characteristic of childhood is not a novel idea. The Sapling model, previously discussed in the section ‘The Sapling Model’ in Chapter 2, adopts this perspective, defining ‘children’ as individuals in the phase of life in which they are progressing towards adulthood. According to this view, being a ‘child’ is merely a specific stage of human life, which concludes with the attainment of maturity. In this understanding of ‘childhood’, the development process is teleologically driven, necessary and endogenous. I highlighted two interconnected issues with the Sapling’s understanding of ‘development’ and, consequently, with their notion of ‘childhood’: first, the arbitrary and vague distinction between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ humans; and secondly, the characterisation of the latter based on reified assumptions of the former. In this section, I explore an alternative approach put forth by John Dewey, which retains development as structural to the temporal framework while sidestepping the problematic and unjust implications of the Sapling’s interpretation of it. I aim to consider whether it is possible to maintain the idea of ‘development’ as integral to a conception of ‘childhood’ without embracing the determinism inherent in the Sapling model. The fundamental contention is that development is not exclusive to childhood, even though it may be particularly prominent during this phase, nor is it teleologically driven.

Before moving on, let me address briefly a distinction between two understandings of how ‘development’ may be temporally determined in order to avoid misunderstandings later on. An individual’s life can be constituted by their temporal framework in two ways.² The first one refers to the teleonomy of a person’s development; that is, the natural and biological end-oriented temporal process of the human being, which forces them to grow, change, wither, and die, without human intervention and without a necessary goal or purpose. The second one refers to a teleology of human development; that is, a goal-oriented process that is triggered by particular human intentions or purposes (Mayr 1998). While the teleonomy of human development simply points to the inherent and inevitable biological fact of our temporal framing (we grow, we become taller, stronger, more cognitively developed, we die), a teleology of development, on the other hand, is a human-initiated process that directs the temporal framework in a particular socially prescribed direction (the rational, self-sufficient adult standard goal to be achieved during childhood is an example of this) (Jenks 2005, 37, 44). By standing against the understanding of ‘development’ endorsed by the Sapling model, I am simply saying that we must distinguish between the two ways in which the development process of humans as temporal beings can be determined by its telos—as a natural end (teleonomical) or as a socially driven (teleological) goal.

The philosopher and pedagogue John Dewey was among the first to identify a flaw in conceptualising the temporal framework of ‘childhood’ as teleological and predetermined by the goal of reaching adulthood (Dewey 1920, chapters 4, 5). He argued that this comparative view of development, which juxtaposes the temporal frameworks of children and adults (with the former being temporally framed and the latter not), restricts our ability to comprehend both the intrinsic characteristics of children and the value that childhood holds in an individual’s life. Additionally, it limits our understanding of the role that the temporal framework plays throughout the entire human life, including adulthood (Dewey 1920, 49–50). In contrast to the teleological perspective of development in the Sapling model, in which childhood is seen as an unfolding of ‘latent powers toward a definite goal [adulthood]’ (Dewey 1920, 65), Dewey proposed a teleonomy of the human temporal framework, viewing life as an ongoing process of development.

According to Dewey, all individuals are temporally framed as developing beings, and humans undergo radical changes throughout their entire life-course. Development is not a phenomenon tied exclusively to childhood; rather, it is a universal aspect of human life that should be taken into consideration in normative deliberations about what is owed to every individual (Dewey 1920, 49–54). This perspective does not negate the importance of prioritising the higher speed and intensity of the development process of certain individuals, such as children or the elderly. Instead, it emphasises that while development may be particularly prominent during specific periods of life, we must not overlook its impact on all periods.

Dewey viewed human beings as possessing a unique plasticity in their condition, signifying their capacity to change and adapt over time, for better or worse. While all individuals undergo transformation and growth, certain internal and external factors can make humans more or less malleable. The plasticity of children and the elderly is heightened owing to their distinct temporal framing, but throughout our entire lives we may encounter situations that reinforce our plasticity, such as an identity crisis, job loss, or becoming a parent. These elements are all part of our ongoing development as humans (Dewey 1920, 57–68). Seeing human beings as constantly developing suggests that we cannot draw a clear threshold to distinguish the needs, interests, and capacities of ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ beings. Plasticity requires viewing humans in all their temporal dimensions; it requires an understanding of what is owed to them in the present, what they will become in the future, and what they are in the process of becoming within their temporal framework.

Emphasising development as a universal trait of human life makes the temporal framework in which we locate children both ephemeral and permanent. From the moment of conception, human beings embark on an unceasing process of change. Their physical and mental abilities evolve and decline, their emotions adapt to circumstances, their future aspirations become realities or setbacks, shaping their self-understanding, and their present actions and circumstances later become memories and experiences. Additionally, even stability in human behaviour can be seen as a form of development (Bronfenbrenner and Morris 2006, 796). Stability requires reinforcement, negotiation, reflection, and affirmation of one’s values, choices, and principles. It demands personal growth, the act of making choices, and the commitment to stand by those choices. In essence, ‘life means growth’ (Dewey 1920, 61), making development a permanent temporal framework of human life.

A ‘lacking’ conception of ‘childhood’ encourages understanding human development in a passive and negative sense that takes the latent capacities and potentialities of the child as unachieved. Opposite to this, Dewey proposed that they should be looked at as positive features:

the terms ‘capacity’ and ‘potentiality’ have a double meaning, one sense being negative, the other positive. Capacity may denote mere receptivity … We may mean by potentiality a merely dormant or quiescent state—a capacity to become something different under external influences. But we also mean by capacity an ability, a power; and by potentiality potency, force. Now when we say that immaturity means the possibility of growth, we are not referring to absence of powers which may exist at a later time; we express a force positively present – the ability to develop. (Dewey 1920, 49)

From Dewey’s perspective, ‘childhood’ is not a passive stage moving towards a predetermined teleology, but rather an active endeavour in which the child plays a significant role in defining the means and objectives of their development. Unlike the endogenous development suggested by Sapling theories, which assume that the child develops guided by an externally imposed objective (Dewey [1897] 1993, 105), Dewey asserts that children themselves have control over both the means and the ends of their developmental process.

According to Dewey, children’s growth and development are not solely aimed at reaching a socially predetermined stage. Instead, they engage in this process to utilise their inherent abilities and potentialities, not only to adapt to their changing nature, but also to actively influence and shape their identity. In Dewey’s view, the child is an agent of their own development, actively participating in the construction of their journey rather than being passively led towards a predefined destination. ‘Development’, in Dewey’s words, ‘is essentially the ability to learn from experience; the power to retain from one experience something which is of avail in coping with the difficulties of a later situation. This means power to modify actions on the basis of the results of prior experiences, the power to develop dispositions’ (Dewey 1920, 53).

Indeed, the temporal framework of ‘childhood’ is not a passive, linear process, but rather an active endeavour that all individuals navigate for themselves. Sociologists of childhood, including Alison James and others, have provided valuable insights into this framework and its implications for ‘childhood’ (James and James 2004; Uprichard 2008). They have argued for an understanding of children as not static, nor reified within their life stage, but rather being situated in their own past, present, and future (James et al. 1998, 207). Moreover, awareness of the behavioural and developmental variability of humans means that, as James et al. argue (James et al. 1998, 63), ‘status positions such as “child” or “adult” cannot simply be regarded as an inevitable, naturalized effect of this passing of time’. Rather, they are relative categories representing the same evolving person, who should be considered in all their temporal facets simultaneously (Uprichard 2008, 306). Taking a teleological approach to understanding development, as some models such as the Sapling conception of ‘childhood’ might suggest (Tomlin 2018a), fails to acknowledge the variable and negotiated realities that children experience as they grow and change (Oswell 2013, 41–2). The pace and direction of development are not uniform; individuals do not all grow at the same speed or towards the same goals. Recognising this variability in development paths and tempos is essential in respecting the diversity of human experiences.

To conceptualise children within the temporal framework, four key claims are put forward: First, the temporal framework should be seen as teleonomical rather than teleological. This means that it is not driven by a predetermined endpoint or goal (teleology), but rather by an inherent tendency for continuous development throughout the entire human life-course (teleonomy). Secondly, the development process within this temporal framework is universal and applies to the entire human life. It is not exclusive to childhood but remains present and influential throughout a person’s entire existence. Thirdly, the inherently gradual nature of development means that strict binaries, such as rigid distinctions between childhood and adulthood, are inadequate to capture its complexity. Instead, development occurs along a continuum, and individuals may experience different rates and paths of growth. Lastly, individuals should be recognised as active agents in their own development process. They possess a certain degree of control over both the means and the ultimate goals of their personal growth, shaping their own identity and affecting change in their lives.

The absence of clear-cut differences between childhood and adulthood, along with the continuous and gradual nature of the human development process, calls for caution against reifying the characteristics, needs, and interests of differently positioned individuals (Archard 2004, 45). Differential treatment can still be justified based on the recognition of certain conditions, but it should be considered in a relative manner, contingent on the degree of its effects rather than a binary opposition between ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ individuals. This nuanced approach to understanding ‘childhood’ within the temporal framework helps avoid simplistic categorisations and recognises the diverse and evolving nature of human development. It encourages a more thoughtful consideration of individual needs and vulnerabilities, allowing for a more just and responsive approach to differential treatment.

In exploring the spatial framework as a constitutive aspect of childhood, it is crucial to acknowledge the work of communitarians and critical political theorists (Taylor 1989, part I; Young 1990, chapters 1, 2; Sandel 1998, chapters 1, 4). These scholars emphasise the significance of situating individuals within their social context and how social structures profoundly shape considerations of morality and justice (Young 1990, 5). It is undeniable that children, like all human beings, are profoundly influenced and conditioned by their social environment. Our identities, development, relationships, thoughts, and behaviours are deeply impacted by our social space, its laws, institutions, culture, and the ways in which others perceive, treat, and socialise us. Recognising the role of the spatial framework is essential to comprehending the essence of childhood.

Indeed, emphasising the social environment as constitutive to the self does not necessarily imply granting normative prominence to the collective over the individual. The claim can be more modest: to transform the current state of affairs, and gain a more profound understanding of the human condition, we must recognise the pivotal role that the social world plays in shaping human lives, rather than attempting to address it in isolation. Our human condition, as both biological and social beings, imposes certain limitations that prevent us from creating perfectly just societies. It is vital to be conscious of these limitations as descriptive facts about the world. Without such awareness, it becomes challenging to overcome the harmful effects caused by social phenomena or grasp the potential benefits that can arise from them.

Being constituted by a spatial framework can be expressed through the concept of ‘embeddedness’. This concept draws from the economic-historical tradition initiated by Karl Polanyi’s critique of formal economic models (Polanyi [1944] 2001, especially chapters 4 and 5). An appeal to embeddedness challenges models of behaviour and normative theories that detach themselves from specific social contexts and history, presenting themselves as mostly universal and ‘universalizable’ (Granovetter 1985, 483–4). These detached political theories are often referred to as ‘disembedded’. In contrast, ‘embedded’ theories are normative and behavioural models that consider the interdependence of individuals, their social and relational context, and their historical conditions as essential to any evaluation. If our intention is to establish a workable conception of ‘childhood’ that can provide normative guidelines, the spatial framework that embeds childhood in a particular social context becomes a necessary feature.

Embeddedness can be approached as a social or non-social phenomenon. Non-social embeddedness refers to the natural environment that shapes human existence, rooted in our embodied condition and explaining our physical presence and dependence on the physical world. On the other hand, social embeddedness pertains to the spatial frameworks that define us not by our biology but by our immersion in specific social and cultural systems.

Children exemplify strong embeddedness from the moment of birth. Their introduction and socialisation within specific social contexts significantly influence their cognitive development, identity formation, and overall growth. This dual aspect of embeddedness holds two implications for the concept of ‘childhood’: first, it highlights the impact of social forces on shaping the concept itself; secondly, it emphasises the plurality and contingency of children’s social embeddedness, which varies according to the specific spatial contexts they inhabit (James et al. 1998; Oswell 2013).

Anthropological, psychological, and sociological research on childhood have employed this spatial framing to challenge universal characterisations and classifications of ‘childhood’, recognising that each child is socially embedded in a distinct setting. Anthropologist David Lancy’s work exemplifies how ‘childhood’ assumes radically different forms across societies; the concept undergoes transformations, as does the understanding of it, and experience of childhood from the child’s perspective (Lancy 2015, chapter 1). Different cultures delineate adulthood through various rites of passage: in some, it may involve becoming a parent, while in others, marriage, economic independence, or going to war signify the transition to adulthood (James et al. 1998, 63). Having explored the role of social frameworks in constructing the concept of ‘childhood’ generally (see the section ‘Childhood as a Social Group’ in Chapter 1), this section focuses on how the embedded nature of children shapes who they are and who they can be at the individual level.

Psychological research on human behaviour and child development reveals the strong influence of environmental factors on the cognitive development and construction of an individual’s identity (Schaffer 1996, 60). This observation, when considered in conjunction with our exploration of the embodied and temporal frameworks, underscores a fundamental claim put forth by psychological literature: the embodied and temporal aspects of a child’s life cannot be detached from the spatial environment in which they grow. Environmental and relational factors play a constitutive role in shaping the child’s identity, just as much as their body does (Schaffer 1996, 46–50, 96).

While it may be possible to distinguish certain elements of an individual’s identity as being influenced by either nature or nurture, most of our behavioural patterns, developmental processes, and identity formation are profoundly impacted by both sources. Therefore, children’s social embeddedness holds equal significance in shaping ‘who they are’ as their genetic make-up. The spatial environment in which the child is situated interacts with their embodied and temporal frameworks, leading to a complex interplay of factors that define their individuality and development.

Sociology further elucidates how the social environment plays a crucial role in shaping the concept of ‘childhood’ and the identities of children. Like the temporal framework, the spatial framework acknowledges the universality of a child’s embeddedness while recognising the importance of specificity in its implications for individual children (Jenks 2005, 6–7). Every conception of ‘childhood’ and the distinct identities, behaviours, and characteristics of children are products of their specific social environments. Consequently, childhood and its various conceptions exhibit significant variations depending on the unique aspects of local contexts and historical periods (Pufall and Unsworth 2004, 18). Moreover, how a particular child responds to, and engages with their socialisation processes also plays a vital role in shaping their childhood experience (Lee 2001, 39; Jenks 2005, 38). Young humans are remarkably receptive beings, continuously assimilating and imitating the behaviours and manners of those around them (Adams 2008, 43). Thus, situating childhood as deeply embedded within these relational dynamics and fundamentally dependent on the social environment is essential for comprehending the complexities of who children are and how they develop.

The concept of ‘embeddedness’ appears to imply a somewhat deterministic understanding of how the spatial framework shapes an individual’s life. It suggests that ‘children’ (or all humans for that matter) are passive recipients of external influences that define and determine who they are. Philosopher Charles Taylor is one of those who advocated for a normatively embedded view of the human being (Taylor 1989, chapter 2). He goes beyond a purely descriptive account of human embeddedness, as explored in psychological, sociological, and anthropological literature. Taylor argues that an individual’s embeddedness within the social context not only constitutes their personhood, but also defines their particular position in the moral universe (Taylor 1989, 27). According to this approach, children are entirely dependent on and mere reproductions of the social world within the ‘horizons’ it provides. The self, therefore, can only be understood as situated and determined within the social dynamics and structures that frame it (Taylor 1989, 36).

As a critique of the Liberationist position, I have argued that certain social constructions and practices must be taken into consideration (as descriptive facts) to evaluate the just normative response to their existence (see the section ‘Forms of Vulnerability’ in Chapter 3). Taylor’s account of the role of social practices goes even further, providing a stronger critique: not only is the separation of the child from their specific socially constructed environment a descriptive fallacy (as I claim), but it is also normatively harmful to isolate the child from their particular social reality. This reality gives meaning to individuals’ identity formation and shapes individuals’ conception of themselves, what is right, good, and just (Taylor 1989, 25–32). Understanding embeddedness as a normative concept implies that an individual can only fully develop as a human agent through the adoption of the particular life conception within their social environment (sociologists would refer to this as ‘internalisation’) (see also Appiah 2005, chapters 1, 2).

The recognition of our dependence on and conditioning by the social world does not imply that we are strictly and unilaterally subjected to it. Despite being constituted through their spatial framing, individuals still retain a certain degree of control over how they relate to their external environment. Acknowledging that the human life’s dependence on its social setting does not necessitate endorsing the idea that it is entirely controlled by it (Benhabib 2002, 51).

John Dewey’s perspective on the process of human development and learning, tied to experience (Dewey [1938] 1997), offers an intriguing viewpoint on how spatial frameworks during childhood could be understood beyond Taylor’s perspective. Dewey recognises children’s dependence on their environment while asserting their active agency in shaping it. As mentioned earlier, Dewey’s main argument regarding ‘human development’ goes against a comparative and passive understanding of it. The mistake made by ‘preparation theories’ of childhood (such as Sapling conceptions) is that they view child development as a distinct stage opposed to adulthood (Dewey 1920, 59). According to this view, children unfold their potential towards achieving a set of predetermined competences based on their capacities and the social environment (Dewey 1920, 65). Dewey contends that this perspective promotes an understanding of childhood as a passive stage of life, in which children develop endogenously only to conform to the exogenous standards of adulthood imposed by a particular social setting (Dewey 1920, 60). This would be analogous to claiming that the embedded framing of children makes them merely passive recipients of their social environment and its exogenous standards.

Dewey’s account of ‘development as experience’ offers a compelling connection between the temporal and spatial frameworks of childhood. If the temporal framework of ‘development’ is not predefined by a teleology, thanks to the child’s active shaping of their temporal frame, then, even though their embedded condition provides a structure to the child’s spatial framework, it does not do so entirely. Through the concept of ‘development as experience’, Dewey places children in the driver’s seat of their own character-building process (see Dewey [1938] 1997). They absorb external influences and stimuli while transforming them according to their own experiences and individuality. As Dewey explains, ‘purely external direction is impossible. The environment can at most only supply stimuli to call out responses. These responses proceed from tendencies already possessed by the individual’ (Dewey 1920, 30).

Dewey’s account of experience transforms both the temporal and spatial frameworks: development becomes an open-ended process defined by the child’s active interaction with their social environment (Dewey [1938] 1997, chapter 3). This view acknowledges the child’s agency in their own development, emphasising that their responses to the stimuli around them stem from their existing inclinations and tendencies. As a result, the child is not merely a passive recipient of external influences but an active participant in shaping their own growth and understanding of the world. By combining the temporal and spatial frameworks through the lens of experience, Dewey highlights the dynamic and dialectical relationship between the individual and their environment, offering a more nuanced perspective on the complexity of childhood and human development.

This understanding of the interactive relationship between individuals and their social environments finds support in both psychological and sociological literature. While acknowledging the constitutive role of the spatial framework in influencing children’s development and identity, models such as the bioecological or the transactional models of development emphasise the importance of considering not only the external properties of a social and natural space, but also ‘the way in which the properties are subjectively experienced by the person living in that environment’ (Bronfenbrenner and Morris 2006, 797).³

The same spatial framing can have dramatically different effects on different individuals, depending on their unique character, history, and experiences. Even two individuals growing up in the same household with identical education, parenting, and external influences can respond and develop in vastly different ways based on their individual tendencies and agency (Pinker 2002). For example, a parent’s negative reinforcement might break one child’s self-esteem but serve as a source of strength and resourcefulness for another. Similarly, living under oppressive social conditions can lead some individuals to submit, while others may be driven to rebellion. It is crucial to understand that social structures do not passively determine children’s development. Instead, children can exercise ‘a variety of modes of agency’, and position themselves flexibly and strategically within particular social contexts, exerting some degree of control over how the environment affects them (James and Prout 1995, 78).

To illustrate this point, Dewey offers the example of an astronomer who is more embedded and situated among the stars within the range of their telescope than in the physical social life surrounding them (Dewey 1920, 13). This example highlights how individuals, including children, can selectively give relevance to certain elements of their environment, thus actively constructing and transforming their spatial framework. For instance, a sporty individual may immerse themselves in the football field, finding a sense of belonging and purpose in the sports community. Similarly, a book-loving child might seek refuge and fulfilment at the library, where they can explore the world through literature. Meanwhile, a child with religious inclinations may find a place of belonging and expression in a church or place of worship. These choices reflect how children’s inherent interests and proclivities shape their spatial framework and how they actively participate in constructing their own sense of identity and place in the world.

Dewey’s open-ended perspective on ‘childhood’ presents a significant shift in how we understand the interplay between the temporal and spatial frameworks that shape a child’s life (Dewey [1938] 1997, chapters 1, 5). It recognises that a child’s development and relationship with their environment are not solely individualistic and internally driven, nor are they entirely passive and determined by external social structures. Instead, Dewey’s view emphasises a complex and dialogical interaction between the self and the world, wherein the child plays an active role in shaping their own development. This perspective aligns with the concept of adaption, acknowledging that while the social environment does embed the child within a particular set of options and choices (the spatial framework), it is the child’s own active interaction and transformation of themselves and their environment that guides the development process (temporal framework) (Dewey [1938] 1997, 130). In other words, children are not merely trapped in and passive recipients of their social environment; instead, they exhibit an adaptive condition, actively engaging with their surroundings and using their inherent capacities to navigate and shape their development.

Conceptualising ‘childhood’ as adaptive rejects the idea of children as passive recipients of their social environment or as entirely self-determining individuals. Instead, it acknowledges that children enter the world with innate dispositions and characteristics that interact with their social environment in complex ways. This perspective aligns with the ‘transactional model of development’, which considers three key factors shaping a child’s developmental path: natural dispositions, environmental conditions, and the particular interactions among the two (Sameroff 1975; Schaffer 1996, 390–5; Moshman 2011).

Psychology’s bioecological model of development, as well as sociological studies on the interplay between structure and agency, further refine this understanding. The bioecological model, proposed by Bronfenbrenner and Morris (2006), emphasises the dynamic relationship between a child and their environment, highlighting the reciprocal impact of each on the other. Meanwhile, sociological approaches explore how individuals actively engage with their social context and exercise agency within structural constraints (Giddens 1984; Oswell 2013).

The bioecological model of human development offers valuable psychological insights into the dynamic relationship between the child and their frameworks (Bronfenbrenner and Ceci 1994). This model aligns with the claims made in this chapter by emphasising the crucial role of environmental contexts (spatial framework), individual characteristics (embodied framework), and their dynamic interaction over time (temporal framework) in shaping human development (Bronfenbrenner and Morris 2006, 795).

Rather than isolating these elements, the bioecological model highlights the significance of their interconnectedness and dynamic relationships in understanding the individual and their development (Bronfenbrenner and Morris 2006, 797–800). While all humans are born with certain genetic dispositions that influence their character before socialisation (Pinker 2002, especially chapter 3), the processes of mental, moral, and physical development during childhood are not uniform for every individual. Each child reacts, responds, and internalises these processes in unique ways (Hoffman 2000, chapter 2; Bloom 2004, 19–24).

The bioecological model acknowledges that specific dispositions, access to social, cultural, and material resources, and the response of social environments to an individual’s inclinations all strongly impact their particular developmental outcomes (Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn 2000; Bronfenbrenner and Morris 2006, 795–6; Paat 2013). Thus, while external frameworks play a role in an individual’s developmental outcomes, understanding the complex process of development and identity-formation requires a consideration of the active interplay between the environment and individual dispositions (Bronfenbrenner and Morris 2006, 797). This perspective emphasises that the individual and their environment are mutually influencing and shaping each other throughout the developmental journey.

An essential takeaway from this discussion is that the internalisation and socialisation processes, which concerned the Liberationists, are not the sole or omnipotent determinants of an individual’s identity or development; they should be seen, in Gibbs’s terms, as ‘opportunities’ available to the child, opportunities over which the individual has a significant degree of control (Gibbs 2014, 68). While our spatial framework does impose certain constraints and limits on the available options, individuals still possess the agency to construct their own life-course by making choices and taking actions within these opportunities (Bronfenbrenner and Morris 2006, 822).

Human embeddedness, despite delimiting the available options to some extent, remains an open framework that allows for adaption and transformation based on individual experiences and dispositions. Thus, in addition to the three constitutive frameworks mentioned earlier (embodied, temporal, and spatial), the person’s character, their unique way of perceiving the world and themselves, and their role as an agent serve as a fourth (agentic) constitutive framework that any understanding of ‘childhood’ must consider.

The concept of ‘adaption’, along with the inclusion of an agentic framework in our understanding of the human condition, aims to avoid two errors that arise from opposite perspectives: the unencumbered and the reified (Bhaskar 1979, 45–6). On the one hand, viewing human life as devoid of constitutive frameworks that bind and limit it (unencumbered) leads to harmful idealisations of human potential and possibilities (Brando 2020). On the other hand, ascribing all-powerful influence to the social world and to its impact on these constitutive frameworks may lead to reifying social practices and customs as if they were objective and unchangeable. It risks portraying humans as passive recipients of external influences, entirely determined by their particular temporal, spatial, and embodied conditions.

I will not say much on the error of unencumbered conceptualisation as I have done so already.⁴ Defining ‘childhood’ in isolation from the embodied, temporal, and spatial frameworks is indeed highly problematic. Humans are shaped by these constitutive features, and ignoring their role in defining ‘childhood’ can lead to serious oversights and injustices. The embodied vulnerability of children, their continuous and dynamic development over time, and their receptivity to the influences of their spatial environment are fundamental aspects of their existence. These features interact and shape the experiences and identity of each child in unique ways. Failing to acknowledge the structural role of these frameworks can result in overlooking the specific needs, vulnerabilities, and experiences of children. It may also lead to questionable normative conclusions regarding who children are, and what they deserve in terms of rights and support.

Acknowledging childhood as structured within embodied, temporal, and spatial frameworks does not imply absolute submission to any particular preconception of these frameworks or how they should shape a child’s life. It is essential to avoid the error of reified conceptualisation, which would treat these frameworks as rigid and unchangeable. The role of the social environment in determining a child’s identity is crucial, but it should not lead to the uncritical acceptance of all cultural practices and traditions without considering their potential impacts on children. Scholars in the African context (see Ncube 1998b), rightly emphasise the need to examine the specific interactions between children, adults, and cultural practices within a social environment to understand potential sources of discrimination and harm. For example, Kabeberi-Macharia (1998) highlights the importance of scrutinising cultural practices such as female genital mutilation and how they can hide harms to children under the guise of tradition. It is essential to recognise the spatial framework as fundamental to understanding ‘childhood’, but this recognition does not mean that every aspect of a given spatial framework is beneficial or just for children.

Sociological studies have shed light on the dialectical relationship between childhood and its constitutive frameworks, exploring the interplay between individual agency and social structures. For instance, Anthony Giddens (1984) critiques both reified and unencumbered views of the human condition. He argues against the notion that society solely determines an individual’s identity and against the extreme belief that individuals construct themselves in isolation (Giddens 1984, 25). Instead, Giddens proposes a dynamic relationship of interdependence between the social and the individual, in which they mutually shape each other (Alderson 2013).

This dialectical perspective emphasises that any understanding of the human condition must consider the interaction between the social structures that influence human behaviour, and the agency of individuals who actively engage in building, maintaining, or transforming these structures (Oswell 2013). It rejects the idea of conflicting dualism, and presents a nuanced view in which society and individuals are seen as two sides of the same coin (Oswell 2013, 45). This understanding holds true even for those who are highly vulnerable, in the process of development, and dependent on social and relational support, such as children. Children are both conditioned by their constitutive frameworks and actively influence these frameworks through their choices and actions as agents (James and Prout 1997, 7; Oswell 2013, 41).

Being embodied, temporal, and situated beings does not imply individuals passively adopt predetermined life scripts based on their bodies, life stage, and social environment (Sen 2006, 5). It involves actively experiencing and adapting to the life predisposed by these frameworks. The social world offers influences, stimuli, opportunities, and limitations, to which individuals respond based on their dispositions and character (Sen 1998, 23–4). ‘Adapting to’ means individuals possess an agentic framework, actively navigating their environment, bodies, and capacities to construct themselves. Children’s constitutive frameworks provide a horizon of possibilities for their lives, capabilities, and choices. Yet they retain agency and control over external influences that shape them, the specific path they take, and how they confront challenges (Sen 2006, 35–6). Understanding childhood as adaptive acknowledges that children actively contribute to their development process, competence acquisition, and interactions with the social world without detaching themselves from their constitutive frameworks.

Viewing children as ‘adaptive’ recognises the power of constitutive frameworks in shaping human life, while acknowledging the child’s central role in determining how this process unfolds. This has two normative implications: First, we must recognise the impact of these frameworks in shaping who an individual can become. Second, we need to acknowledge the child’s agency in shaping their interaction with these frameworks. The dialectical relationship between the child and their frameworks rejects the notion of a ‘unilineal, natural, inevitable and universal progression’ towards predefined notions of adulthood or childhood (Nolan 2011, 2). Instead, it emphasises the child’s active role in their own character development. Considering the child as an agent with inherent dispositions prior to socialisation highlights the responsibility of the socio-political community to respect the child as an active participant and to support their development in alignment with their individual traits.

This chapter has presented an alternative conceptualisation of ‘childhood’, building on the strengths and limitations of the Life-Stage and Liberationist approaches. It has introduced the three constitutive frameworks—embodied, temporal, and spatial—that underpin any classification of ‘childhood’. These frameworks highlight vulnerability, development, and embeddedness, providing a basis for justifying potential differential categorisation and treatment of individuals with varying extents of these characteristics. Additionally, the chapter proposes interpreting the child’s relationship to these frameworks as ‘adaptive’, highlighting their active role in shaping how these frameworks impact their lives. Children are not passive recipients of their constitutive frameworks; rather, they actively engage in shaping their experiences and interactions within themselves. This approach leads to three core principles for conceptualising ‘childhood’:

This conception of ‘childhood’ challenges the validity of rigid, all-or-nothing accounts in two significant ways. First, it refutes the notion of a standard, predetermined track and pace of children’s development. Instead, it asserts that the temporal and embodied frameworks of childhood are not linear and fixed but rather influenced by the child’s unique character and their interaction with the specific social environment. Second, it questions the possibility of defining ‘what a child is’ solely based on the spatial framework in which they are situated. Recognising the active role that children play in navigating and adapting to their environment calls for an open and flexible definition of ‘childhood’, one that accommodates the diverse and variable adaptive processes that individual children undertake in their particular circumstances.

The relationship between the individual and the three frameworks is intricate, with each influencing and shaping the others in a dynamic dialectic. At the heart of this cycle lies the agentic self. As per the bioecological model, ‘the characteristics of the person function both as an indirect producer and as a product of development’ (Bronfenbrenner and Morris 2006, 798). The individual’s agency, innate inclinations, traits, and characteristics impact the formation of their embodied, temporal, and spatial frameworks, which, in turn, influence their vulnerabilities, development, and embeddedness, all contributing to the construction of the agentic self.

From the outset, each individual enters the world with inherent dispositions that shape their temporal and embodied frameworks, as well as their interaction with the social environment (spatial framework), thereby defining their opportunity sets. However, it is essential to recognise that these constitutive frameworks are not isolated; they continuously interact and influence one another. For instance, a child’s specific embodiment can significantly affect their developmental trajectory, while their particular social embeddedness can influence both their vulnerabilities and development paths. Understanding the intricate ways in which these frameworks intersect and influence an individual’s condition is vital for a comprehensive understanding of their claims to justice.

The principle of basic equality requires treating equal cases equally and unequal cases differently, provided that the difference is morally relevant for the assessment at hand. To establish a just and consistent categorisation of ‘childhood’ in line with liberal principles of justice, it requires a non-discriminatory and morally relevant understanding of what makes this category distinct, justifying differential treatment for individuals falling under this heading. Blanket differentiation, as advocated by Life-Stage approaches, and blanket equality, as supported by Liberationists, fail to account for the meaningful equalities and inequalities that render the category of ‘childhood’ morally significant. Instead, the complex interaction between an individual’s vulnerability, development, and embeddedness justifies classifying everyone as different, and necessitates specific treatment as a matter of justice.

Throughout our lives, we may experience periods of being more or less ‘children’, influenced by diverse circumstances, and our unique adaption to constitutive frameworks. There is no predetermined and normative definition of ‘childhood’ or how individuals in this category should be treated (Oswell 2013, 40); it depends on the assessment of the intersections between an individual, their agency, and their constitutive frameworks. The legitimacy of differential categorisation and treatment is contingent upon how acute the influence of these three constitutive frameworks is across an individual’s life. The impact and potential harm that an individual’s vulnerability, development, and embeddedness may have on their life, dignity, and flourishing justify their differential categorisation, and the moral validity of providing them with special protections, restrictions, and provisions not guaranteed to the rest of the human population. This revised conception of ‘childhood’ aims to demonstrate the normative necessity of ensuring differential categorisation and treatment for certain individuals as a matter of justice, while upholding basic liberal commitments.

Joel Feinberg used the idea of ‘relative-child/relative-adult’ to highlight the blurry line that divides these two groups if one considers the individual’s particular condition. He argued that distinctions between ‘childhood’ and ‘adulthood’ should be considered ‘only useful abstractions from a continuous process of development, every phase of which differs only in degree from that preceding it’ (Feinberg 1992, 95). To ensure equal respect for each individual, we must avoid reifying categories and instead develop a system that ensures appropriate categorisation and treatment based on the individual’s actual living condition rather than on harmful generalisations. Revising our conceptions of ‘childhood’, therefore, goes beyond simply advocating for changes in the age or abilities required to be an adult; it calls for a pluralised and critical analysis of the strict category to understand what justifies its existence and apply its standards equally to all individuals.

The main objective in this part of the book has been to explain the moral relevance of the concept of ‘childhood’ and to assess the justifiability of prominent conceptions of ‘childhood’ in the literature, considering their compliance with basic liberal principles. Both Life-Stage and Liberationist conceptions have been critiqued, and an alternative, the Adaptive conception, was presented that can justify differential treatment based on morally relevant traits in certain individuals (partially aligning with Life-Stage approaches), while arguing against the imposition of strict generational classification for differential treatment (in line with Liberationists). By thoroughly exploring the concept of ‘childhood’ and its significance for theories of justice, Part II addresses its second objective: to provide an account of what a theory of rights requires to accommodate the needs of an Adaptive conception of ‘childhood’.