...This essay argues against an approach—one I call cognitivism—that tries to understand synchronic plan rationality as, at bottom a matter of theoretical rationality of belief. This approach is taken by, among others, Gilbert Harman, J. David Velleman, and R. Jay Wallace. I explain...

... superiority to ‘ambivalence’) remains problematic. This is brought into view via a consideration of J. David Velleman’s critique of Harry G. Frankfurt in the light of Freud’s ‘Rat Man’ case. The Rat Man’s problem is not his ambivalence, but the self-misinterpretation that constitutes his reaction...

... Susan aesthetes eudaimonism Tolkein J R R MacIntyre Alasdair on the aesthete teleology narrative unity eucatastrophe transfiguration forklarelse unity 4 Davenport Kierkegaard Narrative Selfhood Harry G. Frankfurt J. David Velleman In recent years, narrative interpretations of selfhood...

... Kavka’s case David Gauthier assurances threats sophisticated choice resolute choice J. David Velleman diachronic self-governance Kieran Setiya My title comes from the last sentence of David Gauthier’s essay “Assure and Threaten.” ¹ In this 1994 essay, together with a series...

... of the mental Hayek F A Searle John R Velleman J David shared intention group intention group self-governance group responsibility planning theory holism of the mental shared policies of weights shared policies of procedure J. David Velleman ^* In my previous book Shared Agency...

...J. David Velleman’s account of emotion as the glue that unifies stories and endows them with meaning is rejected in favor of Jenefer Robinson’s account of the role of responding emotionally to narratives in imparting moral understanding. Robinson’s view is used to expose some pitfalls...

...This essay continues my critique of the cognitivist view that the norms on intention of instrumental rationality and consistency are, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality on one’s beliefs. It critically examines the cognitivist views of Gilbert Harman, J. David Velleman, Kieran Setiya...

... that action has a constitutive aim, then we might be able to solve the foundational problem in ethics. In particular, we could derive normative conclusions from that constitutive aim, and thereby show how claims about universal reasons for action might be justified. J. David Velleman ethics action agency...