
Published online:
21 November 2024
Published in print:
03 October 2024
Online ISBN:
9780191954771
Print ISBN:
9780192864215
Contents
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1 What kind of problem is solipsism, and for whom? 1 What kind of problem is solipsism, and for whom?
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2 Rejection of an epistemic solution and the comparison with the cogito 2 Rejection of an epistemic solution and the comparison with the cogito
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3 The status of the “for-itself” and the status of objects 3 The status of the “for-itself” and the status of objects
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4 From seeing to being seen 4 From seeing to being seen
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5 Other than me, other to me 5 Other than me, other to me
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6 The Other and the discovery of myself as having an “outside” 6 The Other and the discovery of myself as having an “outside”
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7 The attempt to reassert mastery and the notion of “object” 7 The attempt to reassert mastery and the notion of “object”
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8 Reciprocity and the discovery of my own otherness 8 Reciprocity and the discovery of my own otherness
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9 Summary and contrast with Classic problem of other minds 9 Summary and contrast with Classic problem of other minds
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References References
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Chapter
7 Sartre, the Look, and the Cogito
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Pages
144–179
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Published:October 2024
Cite
Moran, Richard, 'Sartre, the Look, and the Cogito', in Berislav Marušić, and Mark Schroeder (eds), Analytic Existentialism (Oxford , 2024; online edn, Oxford Academic, 21 Nov. 2024), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192864215.003.0007, accessed 5 May 2025.
Abstract
Sartre’s discussion of “the Look” in Being and Nothingness is a contribution to the Classic problem of “other minds” but one that radically transforms the orientation of that problem. Sartre seeks a response to solipsism that shares some of the indubitability of the “cogito” but his starting point in self-consciousness differs from a similar starting point in the Classic presentation. For Sartre, the goal of the argument is not an explanation of the behavior of others but rather the demonstration of an aspect of my own being, namely my being-for-others. In my apprehension of being looked at, I recognize my own status as an Other.
Keywords:
Sartre, the Look, problem of other minds, solipsism, recognition, cogito, for-itself, Being and Nothingness
Collection:
Oxford Scholarship Online
Richard Moran, Sartre, the Look, and the Cogito In: Analytic Existentialism. Edited by: Berislav Marušić and Mark Schroeder, Oxford University Press. © Richard Moran 2024. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192864215.003.0007
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