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The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic

Online ISBN:
9780190259952
Print ISBN:
9780199765331
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Book

The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic

Eric A. Posner,
Eric A. Posner

Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law

Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, Chicago, IL
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Adrian Vermeule
Adrian Vermeule

John H. Watson, Jr. Professor of Law

John H. Watson, Jr. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA
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Published online:
20 April 2015
Published in print:
16 June 2011
Online ISBN:
9780190259952
Print ISBN:
9780199765331
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

Abstract

Ever since Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. used “imperial presidency” as a book title, the term has become central to the debate about the balance of power in the U.S. government. Since the presidency of George W. Bush, when advocates of executive power gained ascendancy, the argument has blazed hotter than ever. Many argue that the Constitution itself is in grave danger. What is to be done? The answer, according to this book, is nothing. The book challenges conventional wisdom, arguing that a strong presidency is inevitable in the modern world. It is noted that most scholars object to today's level of executive power because it varies so dramatically from the vision of the framers of the Constitution. But the book finds fault with James Madison's premises. Like an ideal market, Madison's separation of powers has no central director, but it lacks the price system which gives an economy its structure; there is nothing in checks and balances that intrinsically generates order or promotes positive arrangements. In fact, the greater complexity of the modern world produces a concentration of power, particularly in the White House. The book charts the rise of executive authority, noting that among strong presidents only Richard Nixon has come in for severe criticism, leading to legislation which was designed to limit the presidency, yet which failed to do so. Political, cultural and social restraints, it is argued, have been more effective in preventing dictatorship than any law. The executive-centered state tends to generate political checks that substitute for the legal checks of the Madisonian constitution.

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