
Contents
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8.1 Introduction 8.1 Introduction
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8.2 The Two-Tier framework for understanding propositional knowledge 8.2 The Two-Tier framework for understanding propositional knowledge
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8.3 Perceptual knowledge and the Two-Tier framework 8.3 Perceptual knowledge and the Two-Tier framework
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8.3.1 Knowing that p and perceiving that p 8.3.1 Knowing that p and perceiving that p
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8.3.2 A limited yet theoretically substantive account of perceptual knowledge 8.3.2 A limited yet theoretically substantive account of perceptual knowledge
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8.3.3 A Direct approach to understanding perceptual knowledge 8.3.3 A Direct approach to understanding perceptual knowledge
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8.3.4 Summing up 8.3.4 Summing up
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8.4 Perceptual self-knowledge: expression, rational response, and joint attention 8.4 Perceptual self-knowledge: expression, rational response, and joint attention
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8.4.1 Self-knowledge of pain: expressions and rational responses 8.4.1 Self-knowledge of pain: expressions and rational responses
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8.4.2 Perceptual self-knowledge: expression and joint attention 8.4.2 Perceptual self-knowledge: expression and joint attention
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8.4.3 Summing up 8.4.3 Summing up
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8.5 Conclusion and loose ends 8.5 Conclusion and loose ends
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References References
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8 Perception, Perceptual Knowledge, and Perceptual Self-Knowledge
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Published:September 2024
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Abstract
Generally speaking, three distinct phenomena tend to hang together in human perception: perceiving that p, knowing that p, and knowing that one is perceiving that p. This chapter considers how these phenomena are related. I argue that understanding them in the context of a ‘Two-Tier’ epistemological framework, which I have developed in earlier work, automatically delivers an account of these relationships. In short, both perceptual knowledge (that p) and perceptual self-knowledge (that I am perceiving that p) are—in different ways, and for different reasons—explanatorily (but not epistemically) grounded in perceiving that p. The explanation turns in part on understanding perceptual self-knowledge as an aspect of our capacity for rational expression of our states of epistemic perception. We can get a feel for the nature of this capacity, I suggest, by focussing on its exercise in basic invitations to joint perceptual attention.
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