
Contents
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1 Justifications for P-Duties Arising by Virtue of an Assumption of Responsibility 1 Justifications for P-Duties Arising by Virtue of an Assumption of Responsibility
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(i) General Rights (i) General Rights
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(ii) Rights Directly Created by Choices (ii) Rights Directly Created by Choices
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2 Which Relationships and Roles? 2 Which Relationships and Roles?
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(i) Motivation-Dependent Value (i) Motivation-Dependent Value
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(ii) Benefit (ii) Benefit
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(iii) Vulnerability and Need (iii) Vulnerability and Need
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(iv) Incorporation into One’s Agency (iv) Incorporation into One’s Agency
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(v) Voluntary Control over the Entry into the Duty (v) Voluntary Control over the Entry into the Duty
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(vi) The Choice to Occupy a Role Makes One Particularly Well-Positioned to Protect from Harm (vi) The Choice to Occupy a Role Makes One Particularly Well-Positioned to Protect from Harm
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(vii) More Harm Than Good (vii) More Harm Than Good
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(viii) A General Objection. (viii) A General Objection.
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(ix) Summary (ix) Summary
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3 Taking on Tasks and Rescues 3 Taking on Tasks and Rescues
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(i) Promises, Again (i) Promises, Again
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(ii) Careless Performance of a Task Commenced as an ‘Impure’ Omission (ii) Careless Performance of a Task Commenced as an ‘Impure’ Omission
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(iii) Choice as Defeating the Objection to Enforcement of a Moral Duty of Easy Rescue (iii) Choice as Defeating the Objection to Enforcement of a Moral Duty of Easy Rescue
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(iv) Conclusion on Taking on a Task and Rescues (iv) Conclusion on Taking on a Task and Rescues
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4 Public Authorities and Assumption of Responsibility 4 Public Authorities and Assumption of Responsibility
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(i) P-Duties Recognised (i) P-Duties Recognised
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(ii) P-Duties Not Recognised, Despite Commencement of an Activity within the Authority’s Functions (ii) P-Duties Not Recognised, Despite Commencement of an Activity within the Authority’s Functions
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5 Conclusion 5 Conclusion
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5 Assumptions of Responsibility: Part 2—Normative Issues
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Published:September 2024
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Abstract
The previous chapter (Chapter 4) aimed to establish that the current law recognises different strands of assumption of responsibility, and that confusion is likely to ensue if these strands are not disaggregated. This particular chapter is closely connected to Chapter 4, and moves from analysis of the positive law to central normative questions about the duties that arise by virtue of assumptions of responsibility. First, what, if anything, justifies the duties currently arising by virtue of assumptions of responsibility? Second, to which roles and relationships should the law attach legally enforceable P-duties to take care to protect the interests of another? Third, should the law accept that taking on the task of assisting another person generates P-duties to take care in the provision of that assistance by virtue of an assumption of responsibility? Fourth, can the not entirely consistent decisions on the assumption of responsibility by public authorities be reconciled?
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