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Contents
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I. Wrongdoing, Motivation, and Conflicts I. Wrongdoing, Motivation, and Conflicts
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i) Constraining valued outcomes i) Constraining valued outcomes
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ii) Does reason conflict with morality? ii) Does reason conflict with morality?
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II. Interpersonal Views of Wrongdoing II. Interpersonal Views of Wrongdoing
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III. Rejecting Interpersonal Views of Wrongdoing III. Rejecting Interpersonal Views of Wrongdoing
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i) The order of explanation i) The order of explanation
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ii) Motivation and the scope of wrongdoing ii) Motivation and the scope of wrongdoing
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iii) Extending interpersonal views iii) Extending interpersonal views
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iv) Reasons to be moral: Their weight and their quality iv) Reasons to be moral: Their weight and their quality
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IV. Decisions, Actions, and Practical Reasoning IV. Decisions, Actions, and Practical Reasoning
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i) Judging, deciding, and acting i) Judging, deciding, and acting
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V. Wrongdoing, Value, and Freedom V. Wrongdoing, Value, and Freedom
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i) Freedom and respect: The basic idea i) Freedom and respect: The basic idea
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ii) A refinement ii) A refinement
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VI. Defending the Respecting Value View VI. Defending the Respecting Value View
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VII. Conclusion VII. Conclusion
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Chapter
3 Wrongdoing and Respecting Value
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Pages
27–46
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Published:15 December 2016
Cite
Tadros, Victor, 'Wrongdoing and Respecting Value', Wrongs and Crimes (Oxford , 2016; online edn, Oxford Academic, 16 Feb. 2017), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571376.003.0003, accessed 22 July 2026.
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Abstract
This chapter defends a view of wrongdoing where conduct is wrong because we are not free to perform it. The kind of freedom that we are concerned with is moral. We can be free, in this sense, to act against decisive reason, but if we are not free in this sense, our conduct is wrong. This view is contrasted with a familiar interpersonal view: that acts are wrong because they cannot be justified to others, or because others would have good reason to reject them. This interpersonal view is shown to be too narrow to solve the more general problem of the distinctive nature of wrongness.
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