
Contents
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I. Market Monitoring I. Market Monitoring
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A. Reactive Methods A. Reactive Methods
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B. Proactive Methods B. Proactive Methods
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(1) Structural screening (1) Structural screening
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(a) Estimation of market power or competition intensity (a) Estimation of market power or competition intensity
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(b) Identification of set of industry characteristics (b) Identification of set of industry characteristics
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(2) Behavioural screening (2) Behavioural screening
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(a) Structural breaks/regime change (a) Structural breaks/regime change
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(b) Incompatibility with (predicted) competitive behaviour (b) Incompatibility with (predicted) competitive behaviour
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(c) The special case of procurement (c) The special case of procurement
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(d) Violation of mathematical laws (d) Violation of mathematical laws
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(3) Discussion (3) Discussion
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C. Concluding Remarks C. Concluding Remarks
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II. Inspections II. Inspections
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A. The Powers of the Commission A. The Powers of the Commission
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B. Obligations and Rights of the Undertakings B. Obligations and Rights of the Undertakings
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C. Cooperation with National Authorities C. Cooperation with National Authorities
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III. Leniency III. Leniency
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A. The European Commission’s Leniency Policy A. The European Commission’s Leniency Policy
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(1) Immunity from fines (1) Immunity from fines
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(2) Reduction of the fine (2) Reduction of the fine
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B. Leniency Procedure in the European Union B. Leniency Procedure in the European Union
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(1) Immunity from fines (1) Immunity from fines
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(2) Reduction of the fine (2) Reduction of the fine
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C. The Main Benefits and Possible Drawbacks of Leniency Policies C. The Main Benefits and Possible Drawbacks of Leniency Policies
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(1) The main benefits (1) The main benefits
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(2) Possible drawbacks (2) Possible drawbacks
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(3) The benefits of leniency outweighs its possible drawbacks (3) The benefits of leniency outweighs its possible drawbacks
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D. Could the Commission’s Leniency Policy be Improved? D. Could the Commission’s Leniency Policy be Improved?
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Cite
Abstract
This chapter is concerned with cartel detection, through market monitoring, inspections, or well-designed leniency programs. It analyses three methods competition authorities regularly use to detect, and adduce evidence about, cartels. First, competition authorities can detect cartels by monitoring and screening markets. Second, competition authorities can conduct inspections at the business premises or private homes of cartel participants. Third, given the limitations of the first two methods, competition authorities can incentivize companies to report the cartels in which they may be involved by rewarding them for their cooperation. Pursuant to so-called leniency programmes, companies that choose to cooperate will, depending on the quality of the information provided and the time at which it is provided, benefit from full immunity from fines or significant fine reductions (partial immunity). Following in the footsteps of the US Department of Justice, the European Commission adopted a Leniency Notice in 1996, the application of which has allowed it to uncover a vast number of cartels.
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