
Contents
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
9.1 A Problem for Normative Non-Naturalism: What is Normativity or Value? 9.1 A Problem for Normative Non-Naturalism: What is Normativity or Value?
-
9.2 A Solution: Irreducibly Normative Properties as Essentially Commendatory Properties 9.2 A Solution: Irreducibly Normative Properties as Essentially Commendatory Properties
-
9.2.1 Contrast with Motivational Judgment Internalism 9.2.1 Contrast with Motivational Judgment Internalism
-
9.2.2 Comparison with Hybrid Theories 9.2.2 Comparison with Hybrid Theories
-
9.2.3 Why “Commending” and “Condemning”? 9.2.3 Why “Commending” and “Condemning”?
-
9.2.4 Refining the Thesis 9.2.4 Refining the Thesis
-
9.2.4.1 Unknowing Attributions of Normative Properties 9.2.4.1 Unknowing Attributions of Normative Properties
-
9.2.4.2 Disjunctive and Comparative Properties 9.2.4.2 Disjunctive and Comparative Properties
-
-
-
9.3 Three Objections 9.3 Three Objections
-
9.3.1 Commending the Bad 9.3.1 Commending the Bad
-
9.3.2 An Unhelpful Tautology 9.3.2 An Unhelpful Tautology
-
9.3.3 Might Some Natural Property Be Essentially Commendatory? 9.3.3 Might Some Natural Property Be Essentially Commendatory?
-
-
9.4 Further Work the Hypothesis can Do 9.4 Further Work the Hypothesis can Do
-
9.4.1 Characterizing Queerness 9.4.1 Characterizing Queerness
-
9.4.2 Explaining Why Reductionism Fails 9.4.2 Explaining Why Reductionism Fails
-
9.4.3 An Account of the “Essential Practicality” of Normativity 9.4.3 An Account of the “Essential Practicality” of Normativity
-
-
9.5 Conclusion 9.5 Conclusion
-
References References
-
-
-
-
-
9 Irreducibly Normative Properties
Get access-
Published:July 2015
Cite
Abstract
Metaethical non-naturalists maintain that normative or evaluative properties cannot be reduced to, or otherwise explained in terms of, natural properties. They thus have difficulty explaining what these irreducibly normative properties are supposed to be, other than by saying what they are not. This chapter offers a partial, positive characterization of irreducible normativity in naturalistic terms. The chapter argues that to attribute a normative property to something is necessarily to commend or condemn that thing, due to the nature of the property attributed. This theory characterizes normativity in terms of the natural phenomenon of performing certain familiar speech acts. The hypothesis also provides for an account of the “queerness” of normative properties, one superior to other accounts; it explains why metaethical reductionism is bound to fail, in a way friendly to non-naturalism (as opposed to non-cognitivism); and it can help deflect arguments against non-naturalism from the “essential practicality” of normativity.
Sign in
Personal account
- Sign in with email/username & password
- Get email alerts
- Save searches
- Purchase content
- Activate your purchase/trial code
- Add your ORCID iD
Purchase
Our books are available by subscription or purchase to libraries and institutions.
Purchasing informationMonth: | Total Views: |
---|---|
October 2022 | 4 |
November 2022 | 7 |
December 2022 | 1 |
January 2023 | 2 |
March 2023 | 2 |
April 2023 | 4 |
May 2023 | 3 |
July 2023 | 3 |
November 2023 | 3 |
January 2024 | 2 |
February 2024 | 6 |
March 2024 | 4 |
April 2024 | 8 |
May 2024 | 7 |
June 2024 | 3 |
July 2024 | 2 |
August 2024 | 1 |
September 2024 | 1 |
January 2025 | 4 |
March 2025 | 4 |
Get help with access
Institutional access
Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:
IP based access
Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.
Sign in through your institution
Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institution’s website and Oxford Academic.
If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institution’s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.
Sign in with a library card
Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.
Society Members
Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:
Sign in through society site
Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see ‘Sign in through society site’ in the sign in pane within a journal:
If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.
Sign in using a personal account
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.
Personal account
A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.
Viewing your signed in accounts
Click the account icon in the top right to:
Signed in but can't access content
Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.
Institutional account management
For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.