
Contents
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2.1 The miserable child case, the happy child case, and some intuitions 2.1 The miserable child case, the happy child case, and some intuitions
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2.2 The puzzle 2.2 The puzzle
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2.3 Attempts to solve the puzzle that go nowhere 2.3 Attempts to solve the puzzle that go nowhere
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2.3.1 Moral presentism 2.3.1 Moral presentism
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2.3.2 Moral actualism 2.3.2 Moral actualism
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2.3.3 Moral necessitarianism 2.3.3 Moral necessitarianism
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2.3.4 Moral existencism 2.3.4 Moral existencism
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2.3.5 What has gone wrong? 2.3.5 What has gone wrong?
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2.4 The existence-sensitive solution to the asymmetry 2.4 The existence-sensitive solution to the asymmetry
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2.4.1 Where existential status matters and where it doesn’t 2.4.1 Where existential status matters and where it doesn’t
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2.4.2 The existence condition 2.4.2 The existence condition
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2.4.3 Application of the existence condition to the asymmetry, the Pareto reduction principle 2.4.3 Application of the existence condition to the asymmetry, the Pareto reduction principle
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2.4.4 Application of the existence condition to addition plus and double wrongful life 2.4.4 Application of the existence condition to addition plus and double wrongful life
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2.5 Objections and replies 2.5 Objections and replies
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2.5.1 Doesn’t the existence-sensitive solution relocate, rather than solve, the puzzle? 2.5.1 Doesn’t the existence-sensitive solution relocate, rather than solve, the puzzle?
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2.5.2 Doesn’t the existence-sensitive solution assume an irrational (ad hoc, arbitrary) distinction? 2.5.2 Doesn’t the existence-sensitive solution assume an irrational (ad hoc, arbitrary) distinction?
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Cite
Abstract
The two cases that form McMahan’s puzzle of the asymmetry are thought to show that people’s two basic intuitions are inconsistent. In the first, options for a child are just nonexistence and a miserable existence. In the second, options for a distinct child are just nonexistence and a worth-having (“happy”) existence. Intuitively, it’s morally better not to create the miserable child but not morally worse not to create the happy child. How can both intuitions be true? Failed solutions ground a child’s moral status in that child’s existential status or claim that nonexistence can’t be compared against existence. This chapter’s solution—the existence-sensitive solution—rejects moral actualism and accepts nonexistence comparability. But it then identifies an important distinction, via the highly intuitive existence condition, between never existing at all and existing and suffering. Also accepting the Pareto reduction principle, the proposed solution then easily generates both halves of the asymmetry.
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