
Contents
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1. Introduction 1. Introduction
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2. Conventional Norms and Moral Bindingness 2. Conventional Norms and Moral Bindingness
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Some Terminology and Distinctions Some Terminology and Distinctions
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Locating the Project Locating the Project
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3. Why We Can’t Have Nice Things 3. Why We Can’t Have Nice Things
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Moral Accuracy Moral Accuracy
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Moral Knowledge Moral Knowledge
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Moral Understanding Moral Understanding
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Moral Efficacy Moral Efficacy
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Moral Neutrality Moral Neutrality
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Moral Transparency Moral Transparency
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Evil Conventions Evil Conventions
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Fundamental Conflict Fundamental Conflict
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Formulating Principles Formulating Principles
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Explanation and Action-Guidingness Explanation and Action-Guidingness
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The Norms-as-Theorems Model The Norms-as-Theorems Model
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4. A Minimal Theory of Convention 4. A Minimal Theory of Convention
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5. Building up: Accessibility, Regularity and the pro tanto 5. Building up: Accessibility, Regularity and the pro tanto
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6. When (and Why) Are Role Obligations Morally Binding? 6. When (and Why) Are Role Obligations Morally Binding?
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Global Inheritance Global Inheritance
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The Nature and Scope of Presumptive Bindingness The Nature and Scope of Presumptive Bindingness
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Why Should We Believe Presumptive Bindingness? Why Should We Believe Presumptive Bindingness?
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In Situ Holism In Situ Holism
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7. Nice Things Regained 7. Nice Things Regained
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Norms-as-Theorems Model Norms-as-Theorems Model
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Explanation and Action-Guidingness Explanation and Action-Guidingness
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Formulating Principles Formulating Principles
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Fundamental Conflict Fundamental Conflict
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Evil Conventions Evil Conventions
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8. Conclusion 8. Conclusion
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References References
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6 All Together Now: When Is a Role Obligation Morally Binding?
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Published:March 2023
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Abstract
This chapter defends a novel account of the connection between social roles and their associated demands. Consider pairs of statements such as: (a) “Maura is Ethan’s mother” and (b) “Maura has an obligation to provide for Ethan.” It is natural to think that such pairs of sentences don’t merely state two unconnected truths about the agents involved. Rather, in each case, the truth of (b) seems to be in some sense explained by the truth of (a). Competing theories of the moral status of social roles, and their associated obligations, aim to explicate the nature and significance of this explanatory connection. The present chapter does this by arguing that many of the obligations or norms that attach to social roles morally bind us by default. These norms are morally binding since, first, they are ultimately explicable in terms of conventional moral duties and, secondly, those conventional duties enjoy a default but defeasible good standing.
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