
Contents
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10.1 Ordinary sensory imagination 10.1 Ordinary sensory imagination
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10.2 OSI and evidence for possibility 10.2 OSI and evidence for possibility
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10.3 No imagining no concreta 10.3 No imagining no concreta
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10.4 The disappearance story 10.4 The disappearance story
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10.4.1 What is and is not shown 10.4.1 What is and is not shown
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10.4.2 Prompting unreflective belief 10.4.2 Prompting unreflective belief
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10.4.3 Not favored either 10.4.3 Not favored either
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10.4.4 Not even an illustration 10.4.4 Not even an illustration
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10.4.5 A reasonable interpretation? 10.4.5 A reasonable interpretation?
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10.4.6 Epistemological consequences 10.4.6 Epistemological consequences
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10.4.7 The conjunction counter-argument 10.4.7 The conjunction counter-argument
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10.4.8 A reply 10.4.8 A reply
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10.4.9 Another reply 10.4.9 Another reply
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10.5 The backdrop 10.5 The backdrop
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10.5.1 If the backdrop represents empty space 10.5.1 If the backdrop represents empty space
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10.5.2 Being concrete and being physical 10.5.2 Being concrete and being physical
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10.5.3 Concreteness conditions 10.5.3 Concreteness conditions
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10.5.4 One moral 10.5.4 One moral
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10.5.5 A second moral 10.5.5 A second moral
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10.5.6 The backdrop as an absence 10.5.6 The backdrop as an absence
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10.6 Schrader’s marble 10.6 Schrader’s marble
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10.7 Mystical imagination? 10.7 Mystical imagination?
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10.8 Sensory models 10.8 Sensory models
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Cite
Abstract
Chapter 10 argues that imagination cannot provide evidence that there could have been nothing concrete. It discusses both ordinary sensory imagination and a sort of imagination open only to those who have had mystical experience. It first describes sensory imagination, then talks about the degrees of support it might provide for possibility claims. It then argues that sensory imagination provides none of these degrees of support. One main conclusion is that we cannot really imagine there being nothing concrete. Instead, we actually operate by convention. We accept certain other things we can imagine as counting as imagining this, when they actually do not manage it. Because visual imagination often visualizes objects against a sort of backdrop, the chapter discusses the concreteness of space(time), as the backdrop might represent empty space(time). The chapter argues that a substantival space(time) would probably count as concrete. Finally, it contends that mystical experience could not add anything that helps to our imaginative resources, and considers the relevance of sensory models to there being nothing concrete.
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