
Contents
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3.1 Introduction 3.1 Introduction
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3.2 Challenge 1 3.2 Challenge 1
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3.2.1 The centrality of delusions 3.2.1 The centrality of delusions
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3.2.1.1 The central psychopathological significance of delusions 3.2.1.1 The central psychopathological significance of delusions
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3.2.1.2 The central legal and ethical significance of delusions 3.2.1.2 The central legal and ethical significance of delusions
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3.2.2 Autonomy and the centrality of delusions 3.2.2 Autonomy and the centrality of delusions
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3.3 Challenge 2 3.3 Challenge 2
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3.3.1 The logical range of delusions 3.3.1 The logical range of delusions
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3.3.1.1 Delusion as false belief 3.3.1.1 Delusion as false belief
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3.3.1.2 Delusion as true belief 3.3.1.2 Delusion as true belief
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3.3.1.3 Paradoxical delusion of mental illness 3.3.1.3 Paradoxical delusion of mental illness
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3.3.1.4 Delusions as value judgements 3.3.1.4 Delusions as value judgements
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3.3.1.5 Different logic, same practice 3.3.1.5 Different logic, same practice
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3.3.2 Autonomy and the logical range of delusions 3.3.2 Autonomy and the logical range of delusions
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3.4 Challenge 3 3.4 Challenge 3
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3.4.1 Non-pathological delusions 3.4.1 Non-pathological delusions
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3.4.1.1 Delusions normal and pathological 3.4.1.1 Delusions normal and pathological
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3.4.2 Autonomy and non-pathological delusions 3.4.2 Autonomy and non-pathological delusions
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3.5 Concluding remarks 3.5 Concluding remarks
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Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
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References References
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3 Three challenges from delusion for theories of autonomy
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Published:April 2012
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Introduction
The main ambition of this chapter is to identify and explore a series of challenges that the phenomenology of delusions poses to our systematic thinking about autonomy. For the sake of the argument, we shall understand autonomy in terms of intentional agency over time (see, for example, Bratman 2007) and will not expand on the possible interactions between this and alternative conceptions, which either take an ahistorical perspective and define autonomy as a distinctive relationship to one’s motives at the time of action (Frankfurt 1971), or integrate further criteria, such as responsiveness to reasons (Watson 1975) and accordance with particular values (Hill 1991).1 An implication of this methodological choice is that the challenges at issue will have no immediate bearing to emancipatory accounts which define autonomy as a particular social-relational status and therefore have no apparent reason to take delusions as likely failures of autonomy per se, independently of specific institutional contexts (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000).2 In other words, the following discussion is primarily aimed at theories which conceive autonomy as an agency rather than a status concept.3 The central claim is that in order to avoid circularity, such theories should be able to address the subsequent challenges from delusion. This becomes clear if we consider the compelling intuition according to which ‘insanity’ is an obvious case where autonomy as just specified has broken down (see, in particular, Wolf 1987). What seems to be implied in it, however, is that ‘insanity’ is definable independently of whether it compromises autonomy or not. Psychosis as a central mental disorder and delusion, its central symptom, seem to provide the required theoretical leverage. The thought is that, unless delusion is conceived as theoretically independent from autonomy, we would end up with a vicious circle: defining ‘insanity’ as lack of autonomy and then turning back to clarifying autonomy as a state where autonomy is not lacking.
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