
Contents
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§7.1 The best version of act-utilitarianism: Commonsense utilitarianism §7.1 The best version of act-utilitarianism: Commonsense utilitarianism
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§§7.1.1 Maximizing act-utilitarianism §§7.1.1 Maximizing act-utilitarianism
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§§7.1.2 Revised maximizing act-utilitarianism §§7.1.2 Revised maximizing act-utilitarianism
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§§7.1.3 Maximizing securitist utilitarianism §§7.1.3 Maximizing securitist utilitarianism
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§§7.1.4 Commonsense utilitarianism §§7.1.4 Commonsense utilitarianism
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§§7.1.5 Supererogatory versus superperfecterogatory §§7.1.5 Supererogatory versus superperfecterogatory
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§7.2 Securitist consequentialism and the argument for it §7.2 Securitist consequentialism and the argument for it
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§7.3 Commonsense consequentialism and how it compares with traditional act-consequentialism §7.3 Commonsense consequentialism and how it compares with traditional act-consequentialism
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§§7.3.1 Whereas traditional act-consequentialism offers a criterion for evaluating only individual actions, commonsense consequentialism offers a criterion for evaluating sets of actions §§7.3.1 Whereas traditional act-consequentialism offers a criterion for evaluating only individual actions, commonsense consequentialism offers a criterion for evaluating sets of actions
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§§7.3.2 Whereas traditional act-consequentialism is a form of direct consequentialism, commonsense consequentialism is a form of indirect consequentialism §§7.3.2 Whereas traditional act-consequentialism is a form of direct consequentialism, commonsense consequentialism is a form of indirect consequentialism
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§§7.3.3 Whereas traditional act-consequentialism ranks outcomes along a single evaluative dimension, commonsense consequentialism ranks outcomes according to a function of two auxiliary rankings, each along a different evaluative dimension §§7.3.3 Whereas traditional act-consequentialism ranks outcomes along a single evaluative dimension, commonsense consequentialism ranks outcomes according to a function of two auxiliary rankings, each along a different evaluative dimension
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§§7.3.4 Whereas traditional act-consequentialism ranks outcomes according to their value, commonsense consequentialism ranks outcomes according to how much reason the agent has to desire that they obtain §§7.3.4 Whereas traditional act-consequentialism ranks outcomes according to their value, commonsense consequentialism ranks outcomes according to how much reason the agent has to desire that they obtain
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§§7.3.5 Whereas traditional act-consequentialism cannot accommodate the basic features of commonsense morality, commonsense consequentialism can §§7.3.5 Whereas traditional act-consequentialism cannot accommodate the basic features of commonsense morality, commonsense consequentialism can
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§7.4 What has been shown and what remains to be shown §7.4 What has been shown and what remains to be shown
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7 Commonsense Consequentialism
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Published:November 2011
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Abstract
The chapter argues that the best version of act-utilitarianism (as well as the best version of consequentialism) will: (1) evaluate sets of actions and not just individual actions, (2) presuppose securitism as opposed to actualism or possibilism, (3) index permissions and obligations to times, and (4) possess a dual-ranking structure. It argues for a version of indirect consequentialism according to which the moral permissibility of an individual action is determined by whether or not it is contained within some maximal set of actions that is itself morally permissible. This version of indirect consequentialism—viz., commonsense consequentialism—is able to accommodate all the basic features of commonsense morality: special obligations, agent-favoring options, agent-sacrificing options, agent-centered restrictions, supererogatory acts, the self-other asymmetry, and even the idea that some acts are supererogatory in the sense of going above and beyond what imperfect duty requires.
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