Hume’s Epistemology in the Treatise: A Veritistic Interpretation
Contents
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9.1 The Belief in Body Not Produced by Sense or Reason 9.1 The Belief in Body Not Produced by Sense or Reason
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9.2 The Inference from Coherence: Not Causal Inference 9.2 The Inference from Coherence: Not Causal Inference
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9.3 The Inference from Coherence and the Propensity to Complete a Uniformity 9.3 The Inference from Coherence and the Propensity to Complete a Uniformity
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9.4 The Inference from Coherence: Justifying Power 9.4 The Inference from Coherence: Justifying Power
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9.5 The Inference from Constancy and the Idea of Identity 9.5 The Inference from Constancy and the Idea of Identity
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9.6 The Vulgar Belief in the Identity of Invariable but Interrupted Impressions: Psychology 9.6 The Vulgar Belief in the Identity of Invariable but Interrupted Impressions: Psychology
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9.7 The Vulgar Belief in the Identity of Invariable but Interrupted Impressions: Falsity and Justificatory Status 9.7 The Vulgar Belief in the Identity of Invariable but Interrupted Impressions: Falsity and Justificatory Status
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9.8 The Vulgar Belief in Continued Body: Psychology 9.8 The Vulgar Belief in Continued Body: Psychology
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9.9 The Vulgar Belief in Continued Body: Justificatory Status 9.9 The Vulgar Belief in Continued Body: Justificatory Status
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9.10 The Vulgar Belief in Continued and Distinct Body: False 9.10 The Vulgar Belief in Continued and Distinct Body: False
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9.11 The Vulgar Belief in Continued Body: Unjustified 9.11 The Vulgar Belief in Continued Body: Unjustified
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9.12 The Philosophical Belief in Continued Body: Psychology 9.12 The Philosophical Belief in Continued Body: Psychology
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9.13 The Philosophical Belief in Continued Body: Justificatory Status and Difficulties Peculiar to the Philosophical Belief 9.13 The Philosophical Belief in Continued Body: Justificatory Status and Difficulties Peculiar to the Philosophical Belief
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9.14 The Permissibility, Necessity, and Utility of the Belief in Body 9.14 The Permissibility, Necessity, and Utility of the Belief in Body
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9.15 Scepticism about Body and Carelessness 9.15 Scepticism about Body and Carelessness
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9.16 Conclusion 9.16 Conclusion
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9 Scepticism about Body (1.4.2)
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Published:30 January 2014
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Abstract
In the section of the Treatise entitled ‘Of Scepticism with regard to the Senses’, Hume argues that our belief in the existence of continued and distinct bodies arises from a defective causal inference, i.e. the inference from coherence, and from an inference that depends on the relation of identity between impressions, i.e. the inference from constancy. Hume criticizes both inferences as not justifying. The reliability interpretation explains why these inferences are not justifying. It is indeed the only interpretation that can explain Hume’s criticism of the inference from constancy on the ground that the falsity of the vulgar belief in body tells against the justifiedness of that belief. Hume emerges as a thoroughgoing sceptic about continued and distinct body. This is a position to which he is committed by his argument that only causal inference justified belief in unobserved objects.
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