
Contents
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3.1 Introduction 3.1 Introduction
-
3.2 What is it to be a free agent? Moral duty vs. ethical life 3.2 What is it to be a free agent? Moral duty vs. ethical life
-
3.3 The conceptual structure of recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit 3.3 The conceptual structure of recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit
-
3.3.1 The project of the Phenomenology 3.3.1 The project of the Phenomenology
-
3.3.2 The concept of self-consciousness 3.3.2 The concept of self-consciousness
-
3.3.3 The concept of recognition 3.3.3 The concept of recognition
-
-
3.4 What kind of concept is the concept of recognition? 3.4 What kind of concept is the concept of recognition?
-
3.4.1 Interpretations of Hegel’s idealism and implications for the concept of recognition 3.4.1 Interpretations of Hegel’s idealism and implications for the concept of recognition
-
Conceptual realism Conceptual realism
-
Post-Kantian view Post-Kantian view
-
-
3.4.2 Recognition as affirmation of a normative status 3.4.2 Recognition as affirmation of a normative status
-
-
3.5 What reasons do we have to accept the concept of recognition? 3.5 What reasons do we have to accept the concept of recognition?
-
3.5.1 The dialectic of recognition and the meaning of necessity 3.5.1 The dialectic of recognition and the meaning of necessity
-
3.5.2 Intuitions about self-conceptions 3.5.2 Intuitions about self-conceptions
-
Queen Nefertiti who is not Queen Nefertiti Queen Nefertiti who is not Queen Nefertiti
-
The man without qualities The man without qualities
-
-
-
3.6 Conclusion 3.6 Conclusion
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3 The concept of recognition and the problem of freedom
Get access-
Published:February 2019
Cite
Abstract
This chapter, “The concept of recognition and the problem of freedom,” reconstructs the concept of recognition by tracing its dialectical development in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. The chapter offers a reading of the dialectic in which the central animating problem is the nature of freedom: how can a subject affirm its independence in the midst of other subjects; can it do so alone without taking account of anyone outside of it, or is dependence on the recognition of others a condition of its freedom? In addressing this question, the chapter contrasts Kant’s and Hegel’s views on autonomy and freedom. It explores various interpretations of Hegel’s idealism in the course of seeking an account of the concept of recognition that can be acceptable for us today. It argues that recognition is a concept that we ought to employ in thinking about freedom and social relations.
Sign in
Personal account
- Sign in with email/username & password
- Get email alerts
- Save searches
- Purchase content
- Activate your purchase/trial code
- Add your ORCID iD
Purchase
Our books are available by subscription or purchase to libraries and institutions.
Purchasing informationMonth: | Total Views: |
---|---|
October 2022 | 2 |
November 2022 | 1 |
December 2022 | 3 |
January 2023 | 4 |
March 2023 | 2 |
April 2023 | 6 |
May 2023 | 29 |
February 2024 | 3 |
April 2024 | 2 |
June 2024 | 2 |
August 2024 | 3 |
September 2024 | 1 |
February 2025 | 2 |
Get help with access
Institutional access
Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:
IP based access
Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.
Sign in through your institution
Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institution’s website and Oxford Academic.
If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institution’s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.
Sign in with a library card
Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.
Society Members
Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:
Sign in through society site
Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see ‘Sign in through society site’ in the sign in pane within a journal:
If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.
Sign in using a personal account
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.
Personal account
A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.
Viewing your signed in accounts
Click the account icon in the top right to:
Signed in but can't access content
Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.
Institutional account management
For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.