
Published online:
01 April 2010
Published in print:
06 April 2006
Online ISBN:
9780199894093
Print ISBN:
9780195306040
Contents
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One Judge’s Decision One Judge’s Decision
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The Legal Model The Legal Model
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Questioning the Legal Model Questioning the Legal Model
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A More Radical View: Decisions as Rationalizations A More Radical View: Decisions as Rationalizations
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An Example: What Are the Facts? An Example: What Are the Facts?
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The Case The Case
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Justice Marshall’s “Facts” Justice Marshall’s “Facts”
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Justice Rehnquist’s “Facts” Justice Rehnquist’s “Facts”
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Conclusions Conclusions
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Explaining Differences through the Concept of Motivated Reasoning Explaining Differences through the Concept of Motivated Reasoning
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The Attitudinal Model The Attitudinal Model
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Attitude Formation Attitude Formation
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Functional Theories of Attitude Formation Functional Theories of Attitude Formation
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An Example of Values in Conflict: The Case of Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989) An Example of Values in Conflict: The Case of Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989)
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Evidence for the Attitudinal Model Evidence for the Attitudinal Model
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The Theme of Consistency in Decisions: Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun as Examples The Theme of Consistency in Decisions: Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun as Examples
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The Consistent Values of William Rehnquist The Consistent Values of William Rehnquist
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Harry Blackmun: Inconsistent Votes but Consistent Values Harry Blackmun: Inconsistent Votes but Consistent Values
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Summary View of the Attitudinal Model Summary View of the Attitudinal Model
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The Rational Choice Model The Rational Choice Model
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Chapter
5 A Psychological Analysis of Decision Formation
Get access
Pages
109–132
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Published:April 2006
Cite
Wrightsman, Lawrence S., 'A Psychological Analysis of Decision Formation', The Psychology of the Supreme Court, American Psychology-Law Society Series (New York , 2006; online edn, Oxford Academic, 1 Apr. 2010), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306040.003.0005, accessed 12 May 2025.
Abstract
This chapter addresses the question of whether justices really pay attention to the intentions of the framers of the Constitution and to legal precedents in forming their opinions. It then analyzes the legal model, attitudinal model, and rational choice models of Supreme Court decision-making.
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