
Published online:
01 November 2003
Published in print:
28 September 2000
Online ISBN:
9780191598623
Print ISBN:
9780198250746
Contents
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3.1 The Argument from Preventability 3.1 The Argument from Preventability
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3.1.1 Preventability and the Concept of Time‐Dependent Facts 3.1.1 Preventability and the Concept of Time‐Dependent Facts
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3.1.2 The Argument from Preventability and the Time‐Dependence of Facts 3.1.2 The Argument from Preventability and the Time‐Dependence of Facts
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3.1.3 Preventability, and Past, Present, and Future Facts 3.1.3 Preventability, and Past, Present, and Future Facts
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3.2 The Question of Backward Causation 3.2 The Question of Backward Causation
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3.2.1 Causes as Bringing Effects into Existence 3.2.1 Causes as Bringing Effects into Existence
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3.2.2 Causation and Potential Control 3.2.2 Causation and Potential Control
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3.2.3 Four Neutral Arguments Against Backward Causation 3.2.3 Four Neutral Arguments Against Backward Causation
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3.2.3.1 Backward Causation and the Bringing‐About of Contradictions 3.2.3.1 Backward Causation and the Bringing‐About of Contradictions
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3.2.3.2 Backward Causation and the ‘Undercutting’ Of Causal Chains 3.2.3.2 Backward Causation and the ‘Undercutting’ Of Causal Chains
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3.2.3.3 Causation and Increase in Probability 3.2.3.3 Causation and Increase in Probability
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3.2.3.4 A Formal Approach: Causation and the ‘Transmission’ Of Probabilities from Cause to Effect 3.2.3.4 A Formal Approach: Causation and the ‘Transmission’ Of Probabilities from Cause to Effect
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3.2.4 The Basic Difficulty: Backward Causation Without Causal Loops 3.2.4 The Basic Difficulty: Backward Causation Without Causal Loops
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3.3 A Second Objection to the Argument from Preventability 3.3 A Second Objection to the Argument from Preventability
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3.4 Alternative Lines of Argument? 3.4 Alternative Lines of Argument?
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Chapter
3 Temporally Relative Facts and the Argument from Preventability
Get access
Pages
43–71
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Published:September 2000
Cite
Tooley, Michael, 'Temporally Relative Facts and the Argument from Preventability', Time, Tense, and Causation (Oxford , 2000; online edn, Oxford Academic, 1 Nov. 2003), https://doi.org/10.1093/0198250746.003.0004, accessed 4 May 2025.
Abstract
Discusses an argument from preventability to the effect that the past and the present are real, while the future is not. The argument draws on an analysis of ‘It is a fact that p at time t’ as ‘p, and it is logically impossible for there to exist anyone who would have been able, at t, to prevent it from being the case that p’. However, there are two strong objections to the argument from preventability, one relating to backward causation and causal loops, and one relating to the truth conditions for subjunctive conditionals.
Subject
Metaphysics
Collection:
Oxford Scholarship Online
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