https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8621-6977
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Olof Leimar, Game theory models of animal contests: are we at a standstill?: a comment on Chapin et al., Behavioral Ecology, Volume 30, Issue 5, September/October 2019, Pages 1190–1191, https://doi.org/10.1093/beheco/arz144
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It is now almost 50 years since Maynard Smith and Price (1973) originated game theory in biology. Their aim was to explain why conflicts between animals of the same species usually are “limited wars,” not causing serious injury. As has become clear, a major part of the explanation is that contestants gain information and thereby often resolve conflicts at lower cost. In their invited review, Chapin et al. (2019) classify contest models in terms of assessment and describe and propose analyses of experimental data. They follow a tradition started by Taylor and Elwood (2003), involving critical examination of assumptions like mutual assessment by contestants. This assumption was used in a game theory model I developed with Magnus Enquist (Enquist and Leimar 1983), referred to as the sequential assessment game (SAG). Work in the Taylor and Elwood tradition is almost exclusively by experimentalists, who tend to have a charitable view of game theory modeling. Here, I wish to provide a corrective by giving a modeler’s perspective.
