Abstract

Non-horizontal mergers represent a significant proportion of the caseload of China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). MOFCOM has considered two types of non-horizontal mergers: vertical mergers and conglomerate mergers. In the case of vertical mergers, published decisions concentrate on input foreclosure concerns. In relation to conglomerate mergers, published decisions focus on leveraging theories of harm. Non-horizontal mergers are subject to careful scrutiny in China if antitrust concerns arise. These mergers present a higher degree of antitrust risk in China than in other jurisdictions. We examine the framework for the assessment of non-horizontal mergers in China, outline the cases where MOFCOM has considered non-horizontal issues, and conclude with an overview of the factors that MOFCOM considers while analysing non-horizontal mergers.

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