Abstract:

For the past 40 years, Neil Tennant has defended a proof-theoretic criterion of self-referential paradoxicality. According to this criterion, the defining characteristic of paradoxes is that, when formulated within a natural deduction system, they produce derivations that cannot be normalized. This paper raises doubts about Tennant’s approach. Recently, Tennant has suggested that Russell’s paradox might not truly fit his criterion. I will argue that the reasoning that rules out Russell’s paradox can similarly be applied to some semantic paradoxes. Therefore, if Tennant’s assessment of Russell’s paradox holds, few cases may genuinely qualify as paradoxes by his standards.

This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://dbpia.nl.go.kr/pages/standard-publication-reuse-rights)
You do not currently have access to this article.