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Bryan Frances, Philosophical proofs against common sense, Analysis, Volume 81, Issue 1, January 2021, Pages 18–26, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaa039
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Abstract
Many philosophers are sceptical about the power of philosophy to refute commonsensical claims. They look at the famous attempts and judge them inconclusive. I prove that, even if those famous attempts are failures, there are alternative successful philosophical proofs against commonsensical claims. After presenting the proofs I briefly comment on their significance .
disagreement in philosophy, problem of the many, metaphilosophy, common sense, metaphysics, sorites paradox
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