Abstract

In order to uphold the claim that referential intuitions are a reliable source of evidence for theories of reference, Machery et al. (2009) conducted an empirical research by testing truth-value judgments. First, we discuss a conceptual limitation of Machery et al.’s experiment on truth-value judgments. Then, we present the data of an empirical survey that shows that people’s truth-value judgments are not congruent with their use of proper names. We explain why the results of our empirical research refute the conclusions of Machery et al.’s experiment on truth-value judgments. We conclude that referential intuitions are still problematic.

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