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Bence Nanay, Blur and perceptual content, Analysis, Volume 78, Issue 2, April 2018, Pages 254–260, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx119
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Abstract
Intentionalism about visual experiences is the view according to which the phenomenal character of a visual experience supervenes on the content of this experience. One of the most influential objections to this view is about blur: seeing a fuzzy contour clearly and seeing a sharp contour blurrily have different phenomenal character but the same content. I argue that this objection does not work if we understand perceptual content simply, and not particularly controversially, as partly constituted by the sum total of perceptually attributed properties, some determinable, some determinate.
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