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Stephen Kearns, Responsibility from the Margins, Analysis, Volume 77, Issue 4, October 2017, Pages 869–872, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx077
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David Shoemaker’s new book, Responsibility from the Margins, is an excellent and insightful explication of Shoemaker’s tripartite theory of moral responsibility. After setting out the main elements of his account, Shoemaker uses underexplored marginal cases of responsible agency (e.g. psychopathy, autism, depression, OCD and others) to illustrate, support and shape his main theses concerning responsibility. The book as a whole thus presents us with a thoroughly defended, subtle, and plausible theory of the extent and the nature (or, perhaps, natures) of moral responsibility.
Shoemaker takes as his starting point Peter Strawson’s claim that an agent’s responsibility for an action stems from the ‘quality of will’ expressed by that action. In particular, the appropriateness of our reactive attitudes (such as resentment and gratitude) towards an agent depends on what quality of will (if any) is displayed in the actions of this agent. Shoemaker makes the point that reactive attitudes are many and varied – one might be angry at an agent, disapprove of her actions, hold her in contempt, etc. (and, on the positive side, one might venerate her, appreciate her, etc.). The agent herself may regret her actions, feel pride or shame about what she has done, and so forth. Consider, for now, the various negative reactive attitudes one might have towards an agent. Shoemaker doubts that these diverse reactive attitudes are all fitting whenever an agent is responsible for a questionable action. Rather, some attitudes are fitting on some occasions, and some on others. It is difficult to account for this fact while supposing there is one univocal quality of will to which all of these attitudes are a reaction.
