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John Divers, An inconvenient modal truth, Analysis, Volume 74, Issue 4, October 2014, Pages 575–577, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anu082
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There is a de re modal truth that proves inconvenient for the canonical Lewisian theory of modality. For this truth requires on that theory, the existence of things (counterparts) that exist in distinct worlds but are also spatiotemporally related.
antinomy, counterpart theory, genuine modal realism, Lewis, modality de re, spatiotemporal relations
© The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected]
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