Imagination as an intellectual virtue

Abstract

Many philosophers have recently defended the epistemic value of imagination. In this paper, we expand these discussions into the realm of virtue epistemology by proposing and defending a virtue-theoretic conception of imagination. On this account, the intellectual virtue of imagination is a character trait consisting of dispositions to engage skilfully in activities characteristic of imagining, with good judgement and from appropriate epistemic motivations. We argue that this approach helps to explain important connections between related, but distinct, intellectual virtues, including creativity and empathy, and reveals avenues for future work on how best to develop intellectually virtuous imagination.

1. Introduction

The past two decades have seen significant developments in the literature exploring the role of imagination in epistemology (e.g. in edited collections by Gendler and Hawthorne (2002), Kind and Kung (2016), Levy and Godfrey-Smith (2019), Ivanova and French (2020) and Badura and Kind (2021)). Much of this work has focused on whether and how imagination can yield epistemic goods such as true beliefs, justification, knowledge, models and understanding.¹ In this paper, we aim to extend recent discussions of the imagination within epistemology by adopting a virtue-theoretic perspective on imagination and proposing an account of imagination as an important intellectual virtue. In this way, we bring together insights from the philosophy of imagination and virtue epistemology to advance debates in both areas.

2. Imagination, activity and skill

Any attempt to engage with questions relating to imagination faces an immediate challenge due to the apparent heterogeneity of imaginative exercises. Different instances of imagining can involve distinct objects, modes, perspectives and aims, making it notoriously difficult to articulate what it means to imagine (see Strawson 1970, Walton 1990, Kind 2013, 2022a and Liao and Gendler 2020).

Consider the following example of an imaginative exercise:

(Consul) [Imagine] I am the Belgian consul of Chicago.

In response to this prompt, people might imagine in different ways. Consul could be imagined imagistically, in a way that involves deploying imagery, for example, to conjure up a picture or sound: I might see myself sitting at a desk in the Belgian consulate or hear myself giving a speech at some diplomatic event. Alternatively (or, indeed, as well as this), Consul could be imagined experientially, simulating (realistically or not) what it feels like to be this consul. Another possibility is to imagine this propositionally, in a way that may not involve imagery (see Van Leeuwen 2016). This might involve imagining that it is true that I am the Belgian consul of Chicago, and then imagining what might follow (or what might make this the case). There is therefore great variety in the potential objects, modes and perspectives of different exercises of imagination.²

Furthermore, this heterogeneity extends to the possible aims or norms of imagining.³ Our imagination is, in some sense, free to be used according to our purposes. Going back to our example, when imagining Consul, I might be aiming for nothing more than a pleasant fantasy, and so choose to imagine in a way that has little regard for the actual life of a consul (perhaps I imagine a life filled with exciting missions and travel to exotic locations). Alternatively, if my aim is more practical, I might constrain my imagining to match the real responsibilities of a consul (perhaps I am considering a job offer and want to better understand what life will be like if I accept). It is common to distinguish between ‘instructive’ uses, where imagination is used to gain information or understanding, and ‘transcendent’ uses, where imagination is used in ways that depart from what is realistic (Kind and Kung 2016).

While we are broadly sympathetic to this distinction, we want to propose a more fine-grained approach that separates questions about our aims when imagining from questions about how (or to what extent) we constrain our imagination to match reality. We will use instructive imagining to refer to cases where someone uses imagination in an attempt to gain information, understanding or other epistemic goods, and non-instructive imagining to refer to cases where an imaginer’s aims are non-epistemic. We will refer to imaginings as more or less transcendent depending on the extent to which an imaginer allows their imagination to float free of what is actual or realistic. That is, the more an imaginer constrains their imagining to match reality, the less transcendent their imagining will be. Thus the instructive or non-instructive distinction addresses the why of imagining, and the more or less transcendent distinction addresses the how of imagining.

This allows us to recognize additional possibilities: instructive aims can be pursued through more transcendent imagining, and non-instructive aims can be pursued through less transcendent imagining. For example, someone who imagines purely for pleasure might want their imagined fantasy to be as realistic as possible. In such a case, a non-instructive aim is combined with a less transcendent way of imagining. Conversely, someone seeking epistemic goods might nevertheless choose to loosen the reality constraints on their imagining. For example, in reductio ad absurdum proofs, we frequently imagine something we think is the opposite of reality in order to trace its absurd consequences and show that our model of reality is likely to be correct. Fiction is also often presented as involving transcendent imagining, and this too can serve instructive aims. In The House of the Spirits (2011), Isabel Allende fictionally portrays a family’s evolution through Chile’s political upheavals over the twentieth century. While her imaginings create a magic-realist world significantly departing from reality, they nevertheless have instructive aims, such as helping readers to understand aspects of Chile’s political history. The heterogeneity of imaginative exercises, therefore, extends to both the aims of imagination and the ways in which one imagines.

Despite this heterogeneity, one point of broad agreement among philosophers is that imagining is an activity (see e.g. Kind 2022b) that is temporally extended in time (and so can be conceived of as a process; see Wiltsher 2023) and is under voluntary control (at least insofar as we can set our imagination to pursue diverse goals). In what follows, we will take imagining to be the mental activity of simulating or representing experiences, objects, propositions or possibilities, regardless of whether they are actual or possible, in a way that can be voluntarily constrained to either transcend or fit our beliefs and evidence about the actual world. While we are open to alternative definitions, our hope is that this definition is suitably responsive to the heterogeneity of different imaginative exercises and sufficiently broad to ground further discussion.

When we view imagining as an activity, it becomes possible to recognize that this activity can be carried out more or less well. Amy Kind (2021) argues that imagination is a ‘skills-based’ activity on the grounds that it shares features common to skills, including: (a) it is under the intentional control of the agent, (b) it can be done more or less well and (c) it can be improved via practice.⁴ While our intention is not to recount Kind’s arguments here, we want to endorse the idea that imagining is an activity at which people can be more or less skilled. But what is it that a skilled imaginer is better able to do than a less skilled imaginer? Building on Kind’s work (especially 2022a: 40), we suggest the following:

Imagining skilfully involves imagining with ease (smoothness of processing) and control over: (i) which constraints one imposes or removes (such as choosing to align with reality to a greater or lesser extent), (ii) accuracy (such that the result of the imagining reflects the intended constraints or lack thereof) and (iii) clarity (in terms of how detailed or vivid our imaginings are).

What counts as success will then depend on the imaginer’s aims. Going back to our example once more, consider someone with the instructive aim of imagining Consul to help them decide whether to accept a job offer. Given this aim, success will be determined by how well the imaginer selects the constraints they apply to their imagining, how well their resulting imagining accurately matches their intended constraints and the level of detail and vividness that the imaginer is able to generate.⁵ Alternatively, if an imaginer has a non-instructive aim (such as aiming for a pleasant distraction), selecting reality constraints and matching these may be less important in determining success.

We view imagining with ease and control over conditions (i)–(iii) as both necessary and sufficient for skilful imagining. However, being skilled is a gradable concept, and one can be more or less skilled at imagining: Tom and Anna can both be skilled imaginers, even if Anna is better at it than Tom. Given this, we expect that each of conditions (i) to (iii) can be met more or less fully. What is necessary is that one meets at least some minimum threshold with respect to each of the conditions. For example, if Maya regularly attempts to imagine a care-free world, but instead keeps imagining stressful situations (and so regularly struggles to match her imagining to her intended constraints), then she will not count as a skilled imaginer. While we suspect intuitions will differ over what the required thresholds should be, our suggestion is that some minimum level of ease and control over (i)–(iii) is both necessary and sufficient to count as a skilled imaginer.

Having set out the idea of imagining as an activity and explained what is involved in skilful imagining, we are now in a position to propose an account of the intellectual virtue that corresponds to this activity.

3. Imagination as an intellectual virtue

How should we conceive of the intellectual virtue associated with the activity of imagining? One complication is that virtue epistemologists often work with different underlying conceptions of intellectual virtue. Our focus will be on proposing a virtue of imagination based on a responsibilist conception of intellectual virtues.

According to a responsibilist (or ‘personal worth’) conception of virtue, intellectual virtues are ‘personal’ in the sense that they express an agent’s character – their ‘epistemic motivations and value-commitments’ (Battaly 2019: 116). On this view, all intellectual virtues are character traits, with standard examples including inquisitiveness, open-mindedness, intellectual rigour, intellectual autonomy, intellectual humility and so on. Each virtue is distinguished by the characteristic ‘cognitive activity’ to which it corresponds (Baehr 2016a: 91). For example, inquisitiveness is the intellectual virtue associated with the activity of asking questions (Watson 2015); open-mindedness is the intellectual virtue associated with the activity of ‘setting aside a default cognitive standpoint’ (Baehr 2016a: 91); intellectual rigour is the intellectual virtue associated with the activity of carefully checking one’s work. We want to propose an account of imagination as the intellectual virtue associated with the activity of imagining.

Within virtue theory, character traits are generally thought of as ‘multi-track dispositions’, in the sense that they consist not only of behavioural dispositions, but also of dispositions to be motivated in certain ways and to experience emotions in certain ways. For example, the trait of honesty consists not only in dispositions towards honest behaviour, but also in dispositions to be motivated by the value of honesty and to experience certain emotions, such as remorse, when reflecting on one’s past dishonesty (see Hursthouse 1999: 11–12). To make our case for an intellectual virtue of imagination, it is therefore necessary to propose an account that reflects the complexity of such traits.

The characteristic behavioural disposition of virtuous imagination is the disposition to engage in the activity of imagining. While someone with the virtue of intellectual rigour is disposed to carefully check their work, someone with virtuous imagination is disposed to engage in imagining. Setting out the nature of this activity (and what skilful imagining involves) was the aim of §2. However, as with all virtues, mere behavioural dispositions are not sufficient. Someone who regularly engages in imagining might well be imaginative in some sense, but intellectually virtuous imagination requires more than this.

Virtuous imagination also requires appropriate motivational dispositions. According to the responsibilist conception of virtue, all intellectual virtues require an underlying motivation in favour of epistemic goods (Zagzebski 1996: 166–76). For this reason, someone cannot count as an intellectually virtuous imaginer if their motivation for regularly engaging in imagination is simply a desire for pleasure. The same is true of a painter who is skilled at imagining commercially appealing artworks, but who is motivated only by financial gain. Instead, the intellectual virtue of imagination requires being disposed to engage in imaginative activities out of an underlying motivation for epistemic goods (such as knowledge, true belief or understanding).

This point connects with our earlier discussion regarding instructive and non-instructive imagining. Given that instructive exercises of imagination aim at epistemic goods, and that an intellectually virtuous imaginer must be motivated in favour of such goods, we can now say that an intellectually virtuous imaginer will be motivated to regularly engage in instructive uses of imagination.

As with other virtues, the dispositions that comprise the trait of virtuous imagination also include appropriate emotional dispositions. A virtuous imaginer is disposed to feel anticipation or resoluteness at the prospect of engaging in imaginative activities, to experience satisfaction when their instructive imagining proves successful and perhaps to feel regret when reflecting on missed opportunities for epistemically productive imagining. In all these ways, the virtue of imagination fits the ‘personal’ nature of virtues on the responsibilist approach – it consists of dispositions of behaviour, motivation and emotion that express the agent’s character and commitment to epistemic values.

In addition to these dispositions, we propose that intellectually virtuous imagination also requires competence when imagining. Possessing a disposition to imagine, and to do so from epistemically valuable motives, is compatible with nevertheless being unable to work out how (and when) to do so. Virtuous imagination requires being a generally skilled imaginer, in the sense set out above, as well as being able to recognize opportunities for epistemically productive imagining and when it is better to resist invitations to imagine. An intellectually virtuous imaginer will sometimes forego imagining as a route to knowledge when some more appropriate route is available (such as when given the opportunity to ask questions of someone with relevant expertise). In other words, a virtuous imaginer exercises good judgement about how and when to imagine, so as to best promote understanding, true belief or knowledge.⁶

We therefore propose that the intellectual virtue of imagination is a character trait consisting of dispositions to engage skilfully in the activity of imagining, with good judgement and from epistemically valuable motives.

In response, one could doubt the existence of this virtue of imagination. Given the heterogeneity of imaginative exercises, it is plausible that different ways of imagining involve different specific skills. Perhaps there is a specific skill of imagistic imagining, another skill of propositional imagining and so on. If we combine this point with the view that every virtue must correspond to only one specific skill, we will have reason to doubt the existence of any general virtue of imagination. Instead, perhaps we ought to acknowledge only a series of more specific virtues, each corresponding to a more specific way of imagining well (such as a virtue of imagistic imagining, a virtue of propositional imagining and so on).

However, our view is not that every virtue must correspond to one specific skill. An analogy may help to explain why: the virtue of kindness at least partly involves being disposed to help others, but there is no one specific skill of kindly helping others. Rather, what helping requires differs in different contexts, and different ways of helping may require different specific skills. Given this, we could forgo talk of a general virtue of kindness and insist on acknowledging only more specific traits that involve helping others in specific ways (say, a trait of kindness-in-helping-with-emotional-distress, a trait of kindness-in-helping-with-physical-injuries and so on). But this is not a standard way of thinking about kindness (or other comparable virtues). This suggests that virtues do not necessarily correspond to one specific skill. Instead, virtues can involve being skilful in general at a type of activity (such as helping others, ensuring fairness or imagining), where being generally skilful at an activity is a matter of being skilled across a sufficient range of specific ways of engaging in the activity.

These considerations make space for the possibility of what we are calling the virtue of imagination. And yet it remains to be shown that we have positive reason to adopt this virtue-theoretic perspective. Making this positive case will be our focus in the next section.

4. Implications

According to our proposal, imagination is the intellectual virtue associated with the activity of imagining. Conceiving of imagination in this way helps to reveal and explain relationships between imagination and other candidate intellectual virtues that have been proposed in recent literature.

Perhaps the most closely connected trait to imagination is creativity. Indeed, recent work on creativity as a virtue emphasizes this connection. For example, Robert Audi (2018: 28) argues that ‘imagination is the chief constituent of creativity’, while Jason Baehr (2018: 45) suggests that ‘having poor imagination seriously complicates, if not precludes, the possession of creativity’. We agree on this close connection between imagination and creativity, and argue that our account of imagination as a virtue helps to explain the nature of the connection.

What distinguishes the virtue of creativity is a focus on novelty. Intellectually virtuous creativity aims specifically at the production of new or unexpected insights and processes that are epistemically valuable. This view of creativity is compatible with recent accounts from Matthew Kieran (2019: 173), who associates virtuous creativity with a motivation for exploring ‘new, worthwhile ways of inquiring’, and Baehr (2018: 47), who credits the virtuously creative person with ‘identifying new or unexpected possibilities’. Our suggestion is that the virtue of imagination ought to be viewed as a broader trait than creativity.

Both traits (when possessed as intellectual virtues) require skilful imagining combined with good judgement and appropriate epistemic motivations.⁷ However, while imagination can be directed at the production of novel insights or processes, this is not a requirement for virtuous imagination. Imagining can sometimes be purely recreative or involve the synthesis of existing information in imaginative ways. Creativity, with its priority on generating valuable insights or processes that are new, is more specific and can therefore be viewed as a restricted or specialized form of the more general virtue of imagination.

Given its focus on uncovering insights that are novel and unexpected, virtuous creativity may be especially associated with more transcendent ways of imagining. Intellectual virtues require epistemic motivations, and so any associated imagining must have an instructive aim. However, those with the virtue of creativity can be expected to seek epistemic goods by imagining in a way that is less bound by reality constraints and which encompasses a wider range of possibilities. As with imagination more generally, good judgement will be required to ensure that the intellectually virtuous creative person engages in this more transcendent imagining in a way that supports their epistemic goals. Reflecting on imagination as a virtue allows for a mapping of the ways in which creativity is a restricted form of this more general virtue – both in terms of its focus on novelty and in terms of its association with more transcendent modes of imagining. This model helps to explain both the nature of the close connection between the two traits and why failures of imagination can be expected to hinder one’s creativity.

A similar relationship applies between imagination and another recently proposed intellectual virtue – the virtue of empathy. Kotsonis and Dunne (2022) argue that cognitive empathy can be possessed as an intellectual virtue (when the agent is appropriately motivated and competent). Specifically, it is an intellectual virtue that enables agents to ‘gain insight into other people’s emotions and beliefs’ (Kotsonis and Dunne 2022: 5). We agree with this but suggest that empathy (as an intellectual virtue) thereby presents a restricted form of the more fundamental virtue of imagination. Cognitive empathy requires competence in the same sort of imaginative activities as were highlighted above, only with the specific aim of gaining insight into other minds. This restricted aim is what distinguishes empathy from the broader virtue of imagination, in a similar way to how the focus on novelty distinguishes the virtue of creativity. Again, intellectually virtuous imagination is the broader, more fundamental virtue, around which the more specific virtues cluster. This model of the relationship helps to explain why failures of imagination are likely to correspond to failures of intellectually virtuous empathy.

We believe that similar connections can be made between imagination and other intellectual virtues, such as open-mindedness and intellectual humility. Rather than pursue those additional connections here, our hope is that the discussion of creativity and empathy sets out a general strategy for clarifying such connections and demonstrates how adopting a virtue-theoretic perspective on imagination helps to reveal a possible cluster of intellectual virtues – virtues that are associated through being restricted or specialist forms of the more fundamental virtue of imagination. Exploring these connections, as well as the connections between the corresponding intellectual vices, is an exciting avenue for future work.

One further benefit of thinking about imagination as a virtue is that it highlights additional steps that are important for cultivating imagination. As attention turns to how we learn to be better imaginers, there is a risk that the discussion will focus only on how one becomes skilled at the activity of imagining. While this is important, our discussion of imagination as a character trait reveals that this is not all that the appropriate cultivation of imagination should involve. Someone could be a skilled imaginer but never be moved to engage in imaginative exercises, or perhaps only be motivated to imagine in pursuit of a narrow range of non-epistemic goals. To the extent that we are interested in learning to imagine and think this can be beneficial, it is important to reflect on the additional aspects of virtuous imagination identified here, such as the appropriate motivational and emotional dispositions and the competence involved in understanding when and how to engage in imaginative exercises.

The benefits of a virtue-theoretic perspective on imagination are not limited to highlighting additional components that need to be cultivated to possess imagination as a virtue. Drawing together recent developments in philosophy of imagination and virtue epistemology also opens up a wealth of resources for thinking about practical measures for developing (and educating for) imagination. Recent work at the intersection of virtue theory and psychology has produced a range of empirically informed proposals on how intellectual virtues are developed (see e.g. Baehr 2013, Battaly 2015: ch. 7, Baehr 2016b and Wilson and Miller 2019). Those interested in better understanding how we can cultivate imagination will have reason to engage with this work. Once we conceive of imagination as a virtue, and make this virtue the focus of our developmental efforts, the relevance of the virtue education literature becomes easier to assess and apply. This way of thinking about imagination therefore opens up avenues for important future work in this area.

5. Conclusion

We have proposed an account of imagination as an intellectual virtue consisting of dispositions to engage skilfully in the activity of imagining, with good judgement and from epistemically valuable motives. In addition to clarifying the nature of imagining as an activity and how this relates to the corresponding character trait of imagination, we have argued that a virtue-theoretic approach helps to reveal important connections between candidate intellectual virtues and opens up interesting avenues for future research on cultivating imagination. In these ways, making connections between virtue epistemology and philosophy of imagination has the potential to generate important future work in these areas.⁸

References

Footnotes