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Joseph Levine, Perceptual Experience: Christopher Hill, Analysis, 2024;, anae022, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anae022
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In Perceptual Experience, Chris Hill presents an admirably exhaustive account of just that – perceptual experience. His framework is materialist and closely tied to current work in cognitive science, which entails that his basic explanatory tools are representations and the sorts of computational processes that operate on them. Along the way much recent work in the empirical theory of perception is presented, which both illuminates his arguments but also provides a lot of interesting information in its own right; Hill has certainly done his homework. Let me give a brief tour through the book and then focus on a few critical points.
Hill begins his account with an argument for adopting ‘representationalism’ as his explanatory framework, and then proceeds to tackle the thorny issue of what constitutes the representation relation. He appeals to the success of perceptual theories in cognitive science, all of which can be characterized as ‘information processing’ models. But, he points out, ‘information’ alone is insufficient to explain what is happening in perception: we need a notion of ‘representation’ that goes beyond mere information. Representation allows for misrepresentation – inaccuracy – which information does not, and it is more specific and normatively evaluable than information. The idea that representation can get it wrong adds the normative dimension. The problem, though, is to characterize a notion of representation that meets these demands.
